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Abstract. Competition policy has become a salient issue in the last decade. The purpose of this article is to widen discussion amongst political scientists of an issue that has been dominated by the disciplines of economics and law. The concept of a competition policy is the foundation stone of the entire European Union. It lies at the very heart of efforts to establish a common market and within the EU competition policy arena the decision making powers have laid firmly with the supranational institutions. This article provides an overview of the issue; it traces the constitutive foundations of policy and discusses the functions of the core EU competition policy actors. It is primarily concerned with the European Commission, in particular, DGIV. The paper accounts for DGIV's metamorphosis in the 1980s and the myriad of problems now confronting its procedures and efficiency in the 1990s. Whether these defects can be resolved will ultimately determine the fate of DGIV. Arguments for institutional reform are raging through the European institutions and DGIV provides no exception. The paper concludes with a discussion on the plausibility of the creation of an independent European Competition Office, modelled on the role of the German Federal Cartel Office.

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In a world where goods and services (but also people, capital and ideas) are increasingly ignoring national borders, competition policy has emerged as a highly salient issue at the heart of international trade discussions. Aspects of competition policy, from cartels and monopolies to state aids and the liberalization of the utilities, have become a regular feature in the pages of the financial and legal press and have become identified as a central element in any government's policy towards industry and its drive for competitiveness. This article focuses on European Union merger control and although appreciative of the dominance of economics and law in competition policy, stresses the political dimension to competition policy. A government and public administration perspective is essential. This is in evidence in the type of regime, the commitment to enforcing the law, the role of discretion and issues such as transparency and democracy. The example of merger control is used to illustrate how the European Commission (EC) has emerged and operates as a genuinely federal actor in determining and shaping merger policy throughout the EU. In short, this article accounts for policy development, the decision making process and in particular the degree to which discretion and politicization underpin one of the most crucial aspects of economic regulation.Of all the European Commission's current activities in the competition arena, it is merger control that exemplifies this particular policy's potential for controversy. From British Airways/American Airlines to BoeingMcDonnell Douglas and from Coca-Cola/Carlsberg to Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, high profile business restructuring has continued to excite media attention. Merger activity evokes concerns about the development of huge, transnational and effectively "denationalized" companies and hence about the shape of European capitalism within the Single Market (Wilks and McGowan 1995a). Interest in merger policy is intense and there already exists a substantial and growing literature, albeit dominated almost entirely by both economists and their focus on efficiency tests (Neven et al. 1993), and lawyers who stress the "effects on competition"