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On 10 July 2003, a civilian coup was attempted in Anambra state in South-east Nigeria. Barely two months after Chris Ngige was sworn in as the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governor of Anambra, a team of armed policemen disarmed his security detail and took him into custody. The governor's attempted ousting made public the breakdown of his relationship with his political godfather, Chief Chris Uba, and sparked a debate on godfather politics in Nigeria. Using the case of Anambra, this article investigates the complex network of personalised relationships that holders of state power maintain with their national and local clientelistic constituencies. It explores the political underpinnings of the crisis and its links to national-level power dynamics, particularly within the ruling party and the Obasanjo presidency.

Der Madelunganteil der Gitterenergie, MAPLE, wird für LiFeO2 als Funktion von c/a und z0 bei konstantem Molvolumen berechnet. Die beobachteten Werte von c/a und z0 hängen zusammen und können erklärt werden.

No abstract

Vote-trading has become a widespread practice in Nigeria, where democracy has struggled to be fully consolidated due to the country’s complex political landscape and its entrenched corrupt political class. Where acute socio-economic hardship persists, vote-selling traps citizens in self-sabotaging, clientelist relationships with political leaders. Data gathered in 2018, in the second household survey conducted by the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) project, shows that three-quarters of people believe it is broadly unacceptable for anyone to exchange their vote for money or a gift. At the same time, they assume that at least half of people in their community would be likely to sell their vote. Voters are evidently conflicted on the issue. The SNAG research underlines that vote-selling is mostly driven by an individual’s own material circumstances, and highlights the dissatisfaction of Nigerians with how their democracy is not working. The briefing analyses how social beliefs and expectations have contributed to the establishment of an incentive structure where individual voters seek to maximize a short-term material advantage at election time. It offers suggestions for effective interventions to increase voter awareness of the negative long-term effects of vote-trading and galvanize collective action against the practice.