Abstract-Malicious attacks against power systems are investigated, in which an adversary controls a set of meters and is able to alter the measurements from those meters. Two regimes of attacks are considered. The strong attack regime is where the adversary attacks a sufficient number of meters so that the network state becomes unobservable by the control center. For attacks in this regime, the smallest set of attacked meters capable of causing network unobservability is characterized using a graph theoretic approach. By casting the problem as one of minimizing a supermodular graph functional, the problem of identifying the smallest set of vulnerable meters is shown to have polynomial complexity. For the weak attack regime where the adversary controls only a small number of meters, the problem is examined from a decision theoretic perspective for both the control center and the adversary. For the control center, a generalized likelihood ratio detector is proposed that incorporates historical data. For the adversary, the tradeoff between maximizing estimation error at the control center and minimizing detection probability of the launched attack is examined. An optimal attack based on minimum energy leakage is proposed.Index Terms-Power system state estimation, false data attack, bad data detection, power network observability, smart grid security.

Abstract-The problem of constructing malicious data attack of smart grid state estimation is considered together with countermeasures that detect the presence of such attacks. For the adversary, using a graph theoretic approach, an efficient algorithm with polynomial-time complexity is obtained for the design of unobservable malicious data attacks. When the unobservable attack does not exist due to restrictions of meter access, attacks are constructed to minimize the residue energy of attack while guaranteeing a certain level of increase of mean square error. For the control center, a computationally efficient algorithm is derived to detect and localize attacks using the generalized likelihood ratio test regularized by an L1 norm penalty on the strength of attack.

Abstract-The problem of dynamic pricing of electricity in a retail market is considered. A Stackelberg game is used to model interactions between a retailer and its customers; the retailer sets the day-ahead hourly price of electricity and consumers adjust real-time consumptions to maximize individual consumer surplus.For thermostatic demands, the optimal aggregated demand is shown to be an affine function of the day-ahead hourly price. A complete characterization of the trade-offs between consumer surplus and retail profit is obtained. The Pareto front of achievable trade-offs is shown to be concave, and each point on the Pareto front is achieved by an optimal day-ahead hourly price.Effects of integrating renewables and local storage are analyzed. It is shown that benefits of renewable integration all go to the retailer when the capacity of renewable is relatively small. As the capacity increases beyond a certain threshold, the benefit from renewable that goes to consumers increases.

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The problem of characterizing impacts of data quality on real-time locational marginal price (LMP) is considered. Because the real-time LMP is computed from the estimated network topology and system state, bad data that cause errors in topology processing and state estimation affect real-time LMP. It is shown that the power system state space is partitioned into price regions of convex polytopes. Under different bad data models, the worst case impacts of bad data on real-time LMP are analyzed. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate worst case performance for IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 networks. Keywords-locational marginal price (LMP), real-time market, power system state estimation, bad data detection, cyber security of smart grid.