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The survival and growth of technology-based small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with a complex and changeable market environment. Introducing the role of fintech, the paper builds an evolutionary model for growth of technology-based SMEs and analyzes fintech incentive mechanisms to guide corporate growth strategies based on some cases by the simulation. The research results show that the evolutionary game strategy that SMEs are willing to adopt is {cooperation, cooperation}. And, under the incentive mechanism of fintech, the evolutionary game strategy adopted by SMEs and fintech institutions is {cooperation, cooperation, participation}. In the growth of fintech institutions serving technology-based SMEs, the selection strategy of SMEs is more sensitive to changes in fintech institutions’ willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs, and cooperation benefits. The selection strategy of fintech institutions is more affected by changes in cooperation costs and incentive funds during the process of participating in cooperation.

<abstract> <p>The innovation and regulatory coordination of digital currency is an important proposition in the new era of Fintech. There is increasing competition between traditional currencies and new digital currencies, so a spontaneous game model of currencies is analyzed. By introducing the role of financial coordination, this paper revises the evolutionary game model of digital currency innovation, and analyzes their competition strategies through case and simulation. The results show that: first, the dominant result of digital currency spontaneous game is that both parties tend to digital cooperation strategy. Second, with the introduction of financial regulation, the dominant result of digital currency tripartite evolutionary game is that financial institutions tend to participate in coordination and both currency parties tend to cooperate. Third, the choice strategy of currency is more sensitive to the changes of willingness to participate in cooperation, cooperation costs and cooperation benefits of financial coordination. The selection strategy of financial coordination institutions for digital currency is more influenced by changes in cooperation costs and incentive return in the process of participating in cooperation.</p> </abstract>

This paper generalizes the economic features of internet platforms and analyses their competitive strategies with the method of insulating pricing. The analysis focuses on the quantity expectations game of platforms and their price expectations game. The function of network externalities on the internet platforms has an obvious feature of two stages, so their competitive strategies have to be divided into two distinct phases. Before the critical mass stage, companies need to pursue a rapid increase of subscribers in order to survive. After the critical capacity, differentiation strategy can be implemented by platform companies which seek maximum profit by the action of network externalities.