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A permanent advanced population containing 388 SSSLs was used for genetic analysis of seed dormancy; 25 QTLs including eight stable, six major and five new were identified. Seed dormancy (SD) is not only a complex biological phenomenon, but also a key practical problem in agricultural production closely related with pre-harvest sprouting (PHS). However, the genetic mechanisms of SD remain elusive. Here, we report the genetic dissection of SD in rice using 388 single segment substitution lines (SSSLs) derived from 16 donor parents. Continuous variation and positive correlations in seed germination percentages were observed in seven seasons. Genetic analysis revealed the narrow sense heritability in different seasons varied from 31.4 to 82.2% with an average value of 56.8%. In addition, 49 SSSLs exhibited significant difference to recipient parent HJX74 on SD in at least two seasons, and 12 of them were stably identified with putative QTLs in all of their corresponding cropping seasons. Based on substitution mapping, a total of 25 dormancy QTLs were detected on 11 chromosomes except the chromosome 5 with an interval length of 1.1 to 31.3 cM. The additive effects of these QTLs changed from -0.31 to -0.13, and the additive effect contributions ranged from 16.7 to 41.4%. Six QTLs, qSD3-2, qSD4-1, qSD7-1, qSD7-2, qSD7-3 and qSD11-2, showed large additive effect contributions (≥30%). Five QTLs, qSD3-3, qSD7-1, qSD7-4, qSD9-1 and qSD10-1, may represent novel ones. Furthermore, linkage and recombinant analysis delimited qSD7-1 to a locus 1.5 cM away from marker Oi2 and a 355-kb fragment flanked by RM1134 and Ui159, respectively. Taken together, this work conducts a comprehensive genetic dissection of SD and will provide more selections for breeding elite PHS-resistant rice varieties.

Given the limited resources and capabilities of states to maintain cyber security, a variety of co‐production efforts have been made by individuals or by collectives, of varying degrees of organization and coordination. This article identifies different forms of citizen co‐production of cyber security and notes the risk of unintended consequences. Safeguards and principles are proposed in order to facilitate constructive citizen/netizen co‐production of cyber security. Although co‐production of security can contribute to social control, only those activities within the bounds of the law should be encouraged. Activities of private citizens/netizens that test the limits of legality should be closely circumscribed.