No abstract

In April 2012, Delta Air Lines (Delta) purchased a mothballed oil refinery. We use this case to illustrate when, how, and why vertical integration (VI) can hedge input price risk. First, we show that stockholders and creditors expected the move to create wealth. Consistent with their predictions, Delta's exposure to refining margins, cash flow volatility, cost of debt, and default probability all decreased, relative to peers, postacquisition. Our evidence is consistent with the refinery influencing Delta's operating strategies, especially in its most affected markets. The case demonstrates how asset specificity and financial hedging frictions can justify VI.

No abstract

We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.