Information leakages—the unauthorized sharing of an organization's information with another organization—are a growing concern in today's supply chains, but remain relatively underexplored. Drawing on attribution theory and observational learning, our research investigates inter‐organizational information leakages from a network perspective. We assess the spillover effects of opportunistic and inadvertent information leakages between an OFFENDER organization and a VICTIM organization on the relationship between the OFFENDER and a nonpartisan OBSERVER. We consider the roles of integrity‐ and ability‐based trust, as well as operational similarity between the organizations. We conducted scenario‐based experiments with 181 sales practitioners recruited via MTurk and supplemented those results with post hoc interviews. Our results show clear spillover effects: The OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases significantly after any type of information leakage between the OFFENDER and the VICTIM, but more so for opportunistic leakages. Integrity‐based trust mediates the relationship between intentionality and information sharing willingness. We also find indications of an unexpected collateral damage effect in that to some extent, both trust dimensions decrease in both forms of information leakage. Further, for opportunistic information leakages, the OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases more when OBSERVER and VICTIM are operationally similar.

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Understanding negotiators' decision‐making processes in buyer–supplier relationships has been of key interest to behavioral operations and supply chain management researchers. We hypothesize that through the exposure to various counterparts in the supply chain network, negotiators' behaviors are influenced by others' behaviors and prone to behavioral contagion—where the target adopts the behavior he/she is subjected to and exhibits it toward a nonpartisan counterpart. This paper examines such contagion where targets turn into actors of honesty and deception across buyer–supplier negotiations. We analyzed text responses from two studies employing scenario‐based negotiation experiments with 350 and 424 individuals with B2B sales experience and tested for the effects of previously received behavior (honesty/deception) and different frequency levels of the received behavior. Our results show contagion effects for honesty and deception in both studies. These effects are largely independent from the frequency with which the behaviors have been received, suggesting that a low stimulus frequency suffices to induce contagion of honest and deceptive behaviors across buyer–supplier negotiations. Interestingly, in contrast to our hypothesized key mechanism based on the extant literature, neither injunctive nor descriptive social norms mediated the relationship between received and acted behaviors. We offer alternative explanations and discuss implications for theory and practice.

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