This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity's sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life. Keywords Synthetic biology. Virtue ethics. Aristotle. Teleology. Philosophy of technology. Hans Jonas The Bifurcation of Nature Synthetic biologists seek, broadly speaking, to create novel organisms using standardised biological parts and in accordance with engineering principles. The present analysis of synthetic biology will begin with the ontological question of what kind of beings synthetic organisms are, arriving at an answer by drawing comparisons with machines, natural organisms (henceforth 'organisms'), and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). First of all, therefore, we must define these entities, so as to clearly distinguish between them. To some this might seem unnecessary. In fact it is anything but: not only do biologists and philosophers of science frequently describe organisms in mechanistic terms for heuristic purposes (which we might excuse), but many also go further and suggest that organisms actually are a kind of machine [1]. This ontological claim is, I believe, wholly erroneous and serves to undermine ethical analysis concerning both human and non-human life. This misconception has a long and distinguished philosophical pedigree, however, stretching back at least as far as Descartes. Dividing the cosmos into res extensa and res cogitans, or 'extended' and 'intelligent' substances [2], Descartes' ontology promoted a theoretical 'bifurcation of nature' [3]. 1 The former substance, res

Although Hans Jonas's theory of responsibility has been influential on continental European environmental ethics, his philosophy of life, which seeks to rehabilitate a teleological account of living beings and describe their differing degrees of 'existential freedom', is less well-known. In this article, I reconstruct the stages of Jonas's phenomenological account and address the key criticisms levelled at it. I argue that although Jonas's theory is flawed by internal contradictions, these may be rectifiable, and, if so, his philosophy of life could also provide an ontological rationale for a biocentric ethic. I conclude that for these reasons his work deserves greater scholarly attention.

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In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the “philosophical anthropology” presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus’ efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas.

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