As the world's most populous developing country and the world's largest carbon emitter, China has already completed its 2020 Intended National Determined Contribution set out in the Paris Agreement. It achieved this result by adopting a dual goal strategy of economic growth and reducing carbon emission intensity, that is, low-carbon growth. Based on both parametric and nonparametric methods, quantitative and qualitative conclusions about China's low-carbon growth are presented. It is found that since the beginning of this century, China has maintained an annual growth performance of 1% in low carbon Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and low carbon technological progress rate. The Eastern region has leading advantages in low-carbon TFP, low-carbon technology advancement, low-carbon e ciency, and lowcarbon technology leadership. It has the potential to be the rst to reach its CO 2 turning point. The ine ciency ratio of labor and CO 2 is higher at the national level and in the Eastern region, with the two accounting for about seven-tenths and eight to nine-tenths, respectively. The difference is that at the national level, the input-output ine ciency is similar, and the ine ciency in the Eastern region is more from the input side, about eight tenths. At the present stage, China is still lenient in the implementation of low-carbon environmental regulations. In the future, the adjustment of low-carbon policy should pay attention to regional heterogeneity, focus on reducing labor and CO 2 ine ciency, and be more stringent in policy implementation.

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As corporations expand, the owners (principals) delegate managers (agents) to manage their wealth on their behalf. Ceding the management authority to others means shareholders must institute mechanisms that keep their interests aligned with those of managers. One of such corporate governance mechanism that helps with the interest alignment goal is the compensation of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Although there are some previous studies on CEOs' compensation, results from these studies are mixed. Most corporate governance studies suffer from endogeneity problems. Resultantly, the current study uses the dynamic panel system generalized methods of moments (SGMM) estimator to examine the moderation effect of SOE reforms on the nexus between firm performance and CEO compensation using a sample of 1265 non-financial public limited companies on the China Stock Market from 2010 to 2016. The result from the study shows that both current and past firm performances positively influence executive compensation contracts. Although the Renewed Mixed-Ownership Reform was launched at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, its influence on executive compensation began to have material effect after issuing the operational guidelines in 2015. State ownership continued to decrease but remaining high only in strategic sectors. Finally, the extensive reforms positively influenced state ownership as an important governance mechanism in CEO compensation contracts after 2015.