This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms' cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors' perception of controlling families' moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder-debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China. 2 Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms Abstract:This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms' cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors' perception of controlling families' moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder-debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China.JEL classification: G21; G30; G32; G34
This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms' cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors' perception of controlling families' moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder-debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China. 2 Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms Abstract:This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms' cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors' perception of controlling families' moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder-debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China.JEL classification: G21; G30; G32; G34
The aim of this paper is to investigate the association of earnings quality with corporate performance of publicly listed firms of China and tries to provide a new explanation. Poor earnings quality is normally characterized by unhealthy profitability and/or untrue financial information, which leads to a misallocation of capital and low corporate performance. The largest emerging economy of China has experienced a fast and fluctuant growth, while the companies have been thought of low earnings quality. Design/methodology/approach: Initial univariate and multivariate analyses are conducted using four earnings quality measures and either accounting-based corporate performance or market-based corporate performance. Further analyses apply unmanaged earnings, earnings-increase management and financially distressed firms. Findings: The authors find that low earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance for the Chinese publicly listed firm in their sample period. Further evidence shows that earnings management is only a contributor to the negative relationship, not its main driver. They argue that the negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance is a phenomenon of a new emerging market within an economy booming period, particularly in China. Research limitations/implications: The results and argument of this paper may not totally follow the traditional literature. But they provide a new research question that requires further studies. Originality/value: In theoretical discussion, this paper partitions earnings quality into two components: One results from reporting accuracy and the other results from firm's operating outcome. In empirical analyses, this paper examines both accounting-based performance and market-based performance, and both managed earnings and unmanaged earnings.
We investigate the impact of manager political connection and founder status on tunneling in China's listed firms from 2004 to 2010. By classifying the political connections into three dimensions with two categories of controlling ownerships, we find that overall manager political connection is negatively related to tunneling in private firms but positively related to tunneling in SOEs. The CPC/CPPCC-type connection is likely to protect firms from tunneling, while the official-type connection facilitates tunneling from firms. The impact of these two types of political connection on tunneling is stronger at the central level than the local level. A chairman's political connection has significantly greater influence on tunneling than a CEO's connection.We also find that firms with founder-managers have a stronger resistance to tunneling than those with nonfounder-managers, which is still observed in firms with politically connected founder-managers. Our results show that the incentives of various managers towards tunneling depend on their motivation for establishing relevant political connections.
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