The rise of neoliberal agendas of political actors and a wave of privatisation in the globalisation era have often been followed by anti-privatisation strikes. These are union strikes against the privatisation process and against contracting out and opening markets to competition. The article presents the distinction between different versions of constitutionalism regarding anti-privatisation strikes. It discusses two approaches to constitutionalism – the economic approach and the collective approach – and their manifestation in the case law of Israel and the United Kingdom.The collective approach suggests the recognition of a constitutional status of collective rights as a basis for counter-balancing the neoliberal practices of regulators and political actors. Following the effects of liberalisation on the labour market – both in influencing union organisational capacity and in weakening job security of individual employees, the collective approach is aimed at protecting employees’ rights in a globalised-privatised era. Within the collective approach, constitutionalism is used as a basis for recognising anti-privatisation strikes. In contrast, the economic approach denies the existence of a constitutional right to strike against privatisation.The article presents an eclectic model which merges the two approaches, and advocates its adoption. Drawing on New Institutional Economics, the eclectic model offers a theory for moderating the constitutionalism practice and developing partial and restrained constitutionalism. It proposes the adoption of a constitutional right to strike against privatisation, when its application reduces transaction costs and advances efficiency and economic goals for the benefit of the public.

This study investigates the mechanisms that courts apply to expose private social service suppliers to constitutional duties. In doing so, we suggest two variants of welfare regimes: the regulatory constitutional welfare state and the regulatory constitutional neoliberal welfare state. We outline how constitutional rights, including social rights, are applied to private entities, and the tests that courts use in doing so. We then analyze the transformation of traditional jurisprudence in Israel since the 1990s, and we discuss developments in British jurisprudence, which embraces a neoliberal approach. We end with an analysis of the differences between British and Israeli jurisprudence to highlight our theoretical framework’s contribution to comparative research.

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PurposeThe article addresses the tension between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the right to work in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, it explores the operation of corporations in adopting policies of mandatory vaccination and the role of the courts regarding these CSR patterns.Design/methodology/approachThe article examines court case studies of CSR practices regarding unvaccinated employees during the COVID-19 pandemic in Israel and the United States.FindingsThe findings show that the Israeli system adopted the regulating for individual discretionary CSR approach, whereas the American system adopted the regulating for ethical-public CSR approach. Adopting the latter infringes upon the right to work of unvaccinated employees. While in Israel, the possibility of compelling employees to vaccinate is denied, in the American model, mandatory vaccination is possible. As opposed to the American model, in the Israeli model, there is an obligation to consider proportionate measures to isolate the employees while allowing them to continue working.Originality/valueThe article introduces two possible notions of regulating CSR in times of the pandemic – regulating for individual discretionary CSR which is labor-oriented and regulating for ethical-public CSR which is focused on public aspects. While the former posits that corporations should advance individual interests of employees and their right to work, the latter claims that corporations should advance the public interest in health. Following the problems resulting from the Israeli and American cases, the article draws on the lines for a suggested approach that courts should embrace.

Collective labour rights, including the right to organize and strike, were recognized in the principles of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as fundamental rights. Despite their importance, different countries enacted legislation that included a ban on police organization in trade unions or a ban just on police strikes. The right of police officers to organize and strike is of particular importance nowadays at a time of increased public scrutiny and large-scale protests over incidents of extra-judicial killing by police. There is a need to recognize collective rights for police officers in order to improve working conditions and organizational justice at work for them as a way of moderating officers’ perspectives of public hostility and improving their capability to carry out their duties. Another benefit of recognizing a right to organize is the union’s capacity to advance important values, including avoiding racism and violence and assuring the compliance of individual officers with the ethics and code of conduct expected from police officers. This article seeks to address the unique topic of the linkage between the collective labour rights of police officers and varieties of constitutionalism in these critical times. It introduces two potential approaches in this regard: (1) global labour constitutionalism; and (2) militaristic labour constitutionalism. The former implements international standards set by the ILO as a basis for constitutionalism while the latter emphasizes domestic issues and the need to maintain the public order and security of citizens. The article examines the possibility of applying global labour constitutionalism as a basis for recognizing collective rights for police officers.