Research suggests individuals possess multifaceted cognitive representations of various diseases. These illness representations consist of various beliefs, including causal attributions for the disease, and are believed to motivate, guide, and shape health-related behavior. As little research has examined factors associated with beliefs about cancer causation, the present study examined the relationship between personal and family history of cancer and beliefs about the causes and prevention of malignant disease. Data was obtained from 6369 adult respondents to the 2003 Health Information National Trends Survey (HINTS), a national population-based survey. Information about personal and family history of cancer and beliefs regarding cancer causation and prevention was obtained. Results showed both a personal and family history of cancer were associated with differences in beliefs about the causes of cancer. In general, a personal history of cancer was not significantly linked to causal attributions for cancer relative to those without a personal history. In contrast, a family history of cancer tended to increase the likelihood a respondent viewed a particular cause as increasing cancer risk. Thus, personal and vicarious experience with cancer had dramatically diverging influences on attributions of cancer causation, which may be due to differing self-protection motives. Results support the belief that illness representations, in this case the causal belief component, are influenced by both personal and vicarious experience with a disease and also suggest illness representations may influence receptivity to messages and interventions designed to increase appropriate cancer risk reduction behavior.

A recent Supreme Court decision--Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)--prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded (MR) defendants may have raised the attractiveness of feigning this condition in the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, very few published studies have addressed the detection of feigned MR. The present report compared results from tests of intelligence, psychiatric feigning, and neurocognitive faking in a group of 26 mild MR participants (MR) and 25 demographically matched community volunteers asked to feign MR (CVM). Results showed that the CVM suppressed their IQ scores to approximate closely the level of MR participants. WAIS-III and psychiatric malingering measures were relatively ineffective at discriminating feigned from genuine MR. Although neurocognitive malingering tests were more accurate, their reduced specificity in MR participants was of potential concern. Revised cutting scores, set to maintain a Specificity rate of about .95 in MR clients, were identified, although they require cross-validation. Overall, these results suggest that new cutting scores will likely need to be validated to detect feigned MR using current malingering instruments.

Background No research has examined how cancer diagnosis and treatment might alter information source preferences or opinions. Methods Data from 719 cancer survivors (CS group) and 2012 matched healthy controls (NCC group) regarding cancer-related information seeking behavior, preferences, and awareness from the population-based 2003 Health Information National Trends Survey (HINTS) was examined. Results The CS group reported greater consumption of cancer-related information but the CS and NCC groups did not differ in information source use or preferences. The CS group was more confident of their ability to get cancer information, reported more trust in health care professionals and television as cancer information sources, but evaluated their recent cancer information seeking experiences more negatively than the NCC group. Awareness of cancer information resources was surprisingly low in both the CS and NCC groups. Conclusions Cancer diagnosis and treatment subtly alters cancer information seeking preferences and experience. However awareness and use of cancer information resources was relatively low regardless of personal history of cancer.

Current combat veterans are exposed to many incidents that may result in mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) and/or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While there is literature on the neuropsychological consequences of PTSD only (PTSD-o) and mTBI alone (mTBI-o), less has been done to explore their combined (mTBI+PTSD) effect. The goal of this study was to determine whether Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) veterans with mTBI+PTSD have poorer cognitive and psychological outcomes than veterans with PTSD-o, mTBI-o, or combat exposure-only. The final sample included 20 OIF/OEF veterans with histories of self-reported deployment mTBI (mTBI-o), 19 with current PTSD (PTSD-o), 21 with PTSD and self-reported mTBI (mTBI+PTSD), and 21 combat controls (CC) (no PTSD and no reported mTBI). Groups were formed using structured interviews for mTBI and PTSD. All participants underwent comprehensive neuropsychological testing, including neurocognitive and psychiatric feigning tests. Results of cognitive tests revealed significant differences in performance in the mTBI+PTSD and PTSD-o groups relative to mTBI-o and CC. Consistent with previous PTSD literature, significant differences were found on executive (switching) tasks, verbal fluency, and verbal memory. Effect sizes tended to be large in both groups with PTSD. Thus, PTSD seems to be an important variable affecting neuropsychological profiles in the post-deployment time period. Consistent with literature on civilian mTBI, the current study did not find evidence that combat-related mTBI in and of itself contributes to objective cognitive impairment in the late stage of injury.

In a cross-validation of results from L. O. Graue et al. (2007), standard psychological assessment instruments, as well as tests of neurocognitive and psychiatric feigning, were administered under standard instructions to 24 participants diagnosed with mild mental retardation (MR) and 10 demographically matched community volunteers (CVH). A 2nd group of 25 community volunteers was instructed to malinger MR (CVM) during testing. CVM participants obtained Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd ed.; D. Wechsler, 1997) Full Scale Intelligence Quotient scores that were significantly lower than the demographically similar CVH group but comparable to the MR group, suggesting that CVM subjects feigned cognitive impairment. On the basis of standard cutting scores from test manuals or published articles, of the 11 feigning measures administered, only the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; T. N. Tombaugh, 1996) retention trial had a specificity rate >.90 in the MR group. However, the 2nd learning trial of the TOMM, as well as a short form of the Digit Memory Test (T. J. Guilmette, K. J. Hart, A. J. Guiliano, & B. E. Leininger, 1994), approached this level of specificity, with both at .88. These results raise concerns about the specificity rates at recommended cutting scores of commonly used feigning tests in defendants with MR.