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Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees-call them degrees of belief, or credences.2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus.Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality.Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been adequately discharged, various authors move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not.In this paper we scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey); and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: 'degree of belief' should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision: probabilism.Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees-call them degrees of belief, or credences.2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus.Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson

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Since the turn of the millennium, calls for evidence-based drug policy have become increasingly louder. In response, researchers have generated a large body of evidence in support of measures such as needle exchange programs (NEPs), while another strand of research testifies that policy makers often neglect to take the research evidence into account and hence fail to introduce these programs. This article studies the interplay between research-based knowledge, values, and policy making during 16 years of intense parliamentary debate in Sweden on the needle exchange issue. In 2000, the future of the two existing experimental NEPs was uncertain; in 2006, the regulations were reformed; and in 2015, they underwent a government inquiry. Both the reform and the inquiry aimed at regulating and expanding the programs. The analysis is guided by work done within the tradition of science-policy nexus, where the increased emphasis on evidence-based political measures is problematized. As drug policy arouses normative and ethical concerns, the analysis also explores values. The study illustrates the central role that values play in a policy field which is repeatedly declared to be science based. Within the overall framework of the Swedish drug policy ideology of a drug-free society, the advocates of NEPs framed drug misuse as a consequence of either an unjust society or a disease, arguing that because misuse is a condition beyond the control of the individual, the Swedish welfare state has an obligation to take care of those affected. For their part, the opponents framed drug misuse as a result of misguided attitudes, which would only be corrected by restrictions and prohibition. In their view, NEPs are a tool for drug policy liberalization. In the debate between the two positions, research evidence played only a minor role.

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