Recognition memory, that is, the ability to judge whether an item has been previously encountered in a particular context, depends on two factors: discriminability and criterion setting. Discriminability draws on memory processes while criterion setting (i.e., the application of a threshold resulting in a yes/no response) is regarded as a process of cognitive control. Discriminability and criterion setting are assumed to draw on distinct anatomical structures, but definite evidence for this assumption is lacking. We applied voxel-based and region of interest-based lesion-symptom mapping to 83 patients in the acute phase of ischemic stroke to determine the anatomical correlates of discriminability and criterion setting in verbal recognition memory. Recognition memory was measured with the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test. Signal-detection theory was used to calculate measures for discriminability and criterion setting. Lesion-symptom mapping revealed that discriminability draws on left medial temporal and temporo-occipital structures, both thalami and the right hippocampus, while criterion setting draws on the right inferior frontal gyrus. Lesions in the right inferior frontal gyrus were associated with liberal response bias. These findings indicate that discriminability and criterion setting indeed depend on distinct anatomical structures and provide new insights in the anatomical correlates of these cognitive processes that underlie verbal recognition memory.

Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies addressing healthy subjects point towards posterior parietal cortex (PPC) involvement in episodic memory tasks. This is noteworthy, since neuropsychological studies usually do not connect parietal lesions to episodic memory impairments. Therefore an inventory of the possible factors behind this apparent paradox is warranted. This review compared fMRI studies which demonstrated PPC activity in episodic memory tasks, with findings with studies of patients with PPC lesions. A systematic evaluation of possible explanations for the posterior parietal paradox indicates that PPC activation in fMRI studies does not appear to be attributable to confounding cognitive/psychomotor processes, such as button pressing or stimulus processing. What may be of more importance is the extent to which an episodic memory task loads on three closely related cognitive processes: effort and attention, self-related activity, and scene and image construction. We discuss to what extent these cognitive processes can account for the paradox between lesion and fMRI results. They are strongly intertwined with the episodic memory and may critically determine in how far the PPC plays a role in a given memory task. Future patient studies might profit from specifically taking these cognitive factors into consideration in the task design.

Loss of cognitive functions, as apparent through self-awareness, is considered an important indicator of cognitive deficits and is therefore commonly used in clinical practice. However, little is known about self-awareness of cognitive performance, including its accuracy, its basis, and whether people can distinguish their performance across different cognitive domains. In the present study, 20 university students (M (age) = 21.7 ± 2.2 years, 9 males) and 20 middle-aged participants (M (age) = 52.8 ± 3.9 years, 10 males) gave estimations of their performances on executive functioning, memory, attention, and visuoperception before and after confrontation with their capacities. A repeated-measures analysis of variance with age group as a between-subjects factor was performed on the calculated estimation errors, before and after neuropsychological testing. Overall, the estimation errors were significantly higher before than after experience with test performance, ps < .01, partial η²s = .17. An overall effect of domain (four levels), ps < .001, partial η²s = .22 was found. These results suggest that self-awareness is domain-specific, and although it is adaptive to the experience of mental effort, it is most dependent on preexisting beliefs about one's own cognitive abilities.