SUMMARYCentral-local relations are a matter of great importance to developmentalists because they highlight an intriguing puzzle in public administration especially in large states: how policies decided at higher echelons of the formal system can possibly be implemented by the multitude of intermediary and local actors across the system. In the case of China-the most populous nation in the world, the contrast between the authoritarian façade of the Chinese regime and yet the proliferation of implementation gaps over many policy arenas adds additional complexity to the puzzle. This article reviews changes in central-local relations in the 60 years of history of People's Republic of China (PRC) as the outcome of four co-evolving processes, and clarifies the roles of each process: state building and national integration, development efficiency, career advancement and external influences. It points out the continuous pre-dominance of administrative decentralization from 1950s to present time, and the new emphasis on institutionalized power sharing in the context of new state-market boundaries since 1980s. In conclusion, the article suggests going beyond the traditional reliance on the compliance model to understand centrallocal interactions and the abundant implementation gaps in a context of central-local co-agency, thereby improving policy implementation.

No abstract

No abstract

provinces is likely to fall. The question asked here is: given the theoretical possibility of provincial choice in a resourceful setting, how are provincial choices actually made in light of differential central policy? In other words, whilst similarities of Guangdong and Shanghai, namely their large resource base, point to the possibility of provincial choice, differences over central policy as applied to the two direct attention to the influence of central policies on such choice. Unresolved Questions 8 S t u d i e s o n C h i n a ' s p o s t-1949 central-provincial relations have moved progressively towards recognition of the existence of provincial power. New data surfaced, from time to time, and required new approaches for adequate explanation and description. In this way the image of the provinces, and their leaders, has moved from one of the loyal agents of the Centre in the totalitarian literature of the 1950s and 1960s, 9 to that of responsive but coerced entities during the Cultural Revolution 10 and, subsequently since the 1980s, to an image of the powerful if unequal bargaining partners of the Centre. 11 The unfolding of events within China led analysts to recognize that provinces did, in fact, wield power vis-à-vis the Centre. Upon closer examination, however, the nature of provincial power that previous analyses have documented remains highly unclear. There is the need to reconcile the coexistence of apparently contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, there were the multiple successes of provincial leaders in their manoeuvring with central policies.

No abstract