No abstract

Unlike their US counterparts, European convertible debt issuers tend to be large companies with small debt-and equity-related financing costs. Therefore, it is puzzling why these firms issue convertibles instead of standard financing instruments. This paper examines European convertible debt issuer motivations by estimating a security choice model that incorporates convertibles, straight debt, and equity. We find that European convertibles are used as sweetened debt, not as delayed equity. This motivation is reflected in the debt-like design of most European convertible issues.

This paper hypothesizes that hot convertible debt windows represent periods with lower convertible debt-related financing costs. Supporting this premise, we find that the stock price impact of Western European convertible debt announcements is significantly less negative during hot convertible debt windows. Importantly, this result holds while controlling for equity and straight debt issuance volumes and for macroeconomic conditions. In addition, stockholders are less sensitive to issuerand issue-specific financing costs during hot convertible debt markets. Overall, these findings indicate that hot convertible debt markets represent windows of opportunity for convertible debt issuance. Firms with high idiosyncratic financing costs act accordingly by timing their convertible debt offering during a hot market.

bank debt, capital structure, entrepreneur, private benefits of control, start-up, trade credit, C31, G21, G32, L26, M13,

The popular financial press often suggests that convertible debt issued by European firms is more debt-like in nature than convertible debt issued by US firms. This paper is the first to formally test the validity of this common perception. Our evidence indicates that European convertibles are effectively structured to be more debt-like than US convertibles. We also show that European convertible debt announcements induce less negative stockholder reactions than US announcements, which is consistent with the larger debt component of the former securities. Lastly, we explore some potential explanations for the relatively more debt-like design of European convertibles. Our results indicate that this finding may be attributable to both issuer-related and institutional differences across European and US convertible debt markets.