Biometric authentication is getting increasingly popular and demands a wide range of solutions to against increasing cybercrimes and digital identity thefts. This paper proposes a new privacypreserving cancelable biometric authentication key agreement scheme, which improves the existing authentication scheme based on ECC. We are going to integrate the fuzzy commitment and cancelable biometrics to guarantee the security for user's biometric information. The cancelable biometrics named as the random distance method (RDM) which can generate non-invertible and privacy-preserving revocable pseudo-biometric identities. The proposed scheme realizes the mutual authentication of participants, and the privacy of biometric information and also can resist the vast majority of existing attacks. We use the widely accepted BPR adversary model to formally prove the safety features of our scheme. Further, the comparison of other existing related schemes shows that the performance of this scheme has greater advantages in terms of computation cost and communication cost. The experiments demonstrate that this scheme can achieves higher accuracy, while preserving biometric information privacy.

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Summary With the rapid popularity of social networking platforms, users can be matched when sharing their profiles. However, there is a risk of leakage of sensitive user information during the user matching process, which leads to the lack of user privacy protection. In this paper, we propose a privacy protection scheme based on the encryption of hidden attributes during user matching in mobile social networks, which uses linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) as the access structure based on ciphertext policy attribute‐based encryption (CP‐ABE), and the match server can perform friend recommendation by completing bi‐directional attribute matching determination without disclosing user attribute information. In addition, the use of selective keywords protects the privacy of requesters and publishers in selecting keywords and selecting plaintext attacks. The scheme reduces the encryption and decryption overhead for users by dividing encryption into a preparation phase and an online phase and shifting most of the decryption overhead from the requester to the match server. The experimental results show that the scheme ensures user privacy while effectively reducing communication overhead.

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