T his article analyzes what I term "the dilemma of democratic competence," which emerges when researchers find their expectations regarding democratic responsiveness to be in conflict with their findings regarding the context dependency of individual preferences. I attribute this dilemma to scholars' normative expectations, rather than to deficiencies of mass democratic politics. I propose a mobilization conception of political representation and develop a systemic understanding of reflexivity as the measure of its legitimacy. This article thus contributes to the emergent normative argument that political representation is intrinsic to democratic government, and links that claim to empirical research on political preference formation.

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That acts of democratic representation participate in creating the interests for which legislators and other officials purport merely to stand gives rise to the “constituency paradox.” I elucidate this paradox through a critical reading of Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation, together with her classic study of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein and Justice. Pitkin's core insight into democratic representation is that democratic representation is “quasi-performative”: an activity that mobilizes constituencies by the interests it claims in their name. I develop this insight together with its implications for contemporary scholarship on the political effects of economic equality. I conclude by arguing that the fundamental democratic deficiency of the US political system goes much deeper than its disproportionate responsiveness to wealthy interests; it is a matter of system biases that foster the formation and expression of those interests, while mitigating against mobilization by those Americans who want inequality to be reduced.

Local community opposition constitutes the single greatest hurdle to the siting of hazardous waste facilities in the United States. Conventional explanations of its causes focus on questions of risk and equity; that is, on outcomes of facility siting. In this focus it is assumed that hazardous waste management is synonymous with facility siting, when siting is in fact only one of many possible answers to the management problem. Rather than ask why local communities oppose facility sitings, it is asked how the waste management problem gets defined as a siting problem in the first place, and how public participation in the siting process is postponed until it is defined around a specific location. The analysis shifts the focus from siting outcomes to the fundamental structure of hazardous waste regulatory policy. A strong claim is asserted: that the basic assumptions of hazardous waste regulation define the hazardous waste problem as a locational problem confronting the state, rather than an investment problem for capital, and that local opposition to hazardous waste facility siting is a reaction against these basic assumptions. Local opposition to facility siting is explained in terms of the structural constraints that dispose the state to define management problems as siting problems and to arbitrate the siting disputes by means of interest-group conflict. This explanation, in turn, helps to clarify the conceptual and practical relationship between state structure and political process by disclosing the ways that pluralist democracy helps the state to manage politics in a way that sustains the basic assumptions that structure its relation to capital.

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