In Canada, financial advisors and dealers are required by provincial securities commissions and self-regulatory organizations—charged with direct regulation over investment dealers and mutual fund dealers—to respectively collect and maintain know your client (KYC) information, such as their age or risk tolerance, for investor accounts. With this information, investors, under their advisor’s guidance, make decisions on their investments that are presumed to be beneficial to their investment goals. Our unique dataset is provided by a financial investment dealer with over 50,000 accounts for over 23,000 clients covering the period from January 1st to August 12th 2019. We use a modified behavioral finance recency, frequency, monetary model for engineering features that quantify investor behaviours, and unsupervised machine learning clustering algorithms to find groups of investors that behave similarly. We show that the KYC information—such as gender, residence region, and marital status—does not explain client behaviours, whereas eight variables for trade and transaction frequency and volume are most informative. Hence, our results should encourage financial regulators and advisors to use more advanced metrics to better understand and predict investor behaviours.

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Financial advisors use questionnaires and discussions with clients to determine investment goals, elicit risk preference and tolerance and establish a suitable portfolio allocation for different risk categories. Financial institutions assign risk ratings to their financial products. Advisors use these ratings to categorize products into the same risk categories used for portfolio allocation.Subsequently, clients select a portfolio of assets whose risk profile we call revealed risk. This paper proposes a novel methodology for comparing an individual's elicited and revealed risk. We propose using Value-at-Risk to measure elicited and revealed risk and the discrepancy between them, showing whether clients are over-risked or under-risked. We demonstrate the methodology using a dataset from a Canadian private financial dealer. We find that elicited risk is consistently higher than revealed risk-advisors build a safety buffer into their recommendations-and elicited risk varies with respect to demographic features and trading behaviors in expected ways-investors are receiving sound advice. This risk discrepancy could be used, for example, to gauge the quality of financial advice an individual is receiving, or it could be used to help advisors communicate inconsistencies between client trading actions and client goals. Our methodology falls into the interest realms of advisors, regulators, and dealerships.

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