Discretion arises when an official is empowered to exercise public authority and afforded scope to decide how that authority should be exercised in particular circumstances. At root, discretion is about power and judgment. Not surprisingly, discretion is the focus of countless law and policy initiatives designed to preserve, enhance, check, limit, shape, or eliminate discretion in a host of different settings. The articles in this special issue of CJLS/ RCDS canvass settings as diverse as prosecutors, border guards, universities, and immigration decision makers. It generates heated political debate, excited social commentary, and intensive scholarly explorations. The question of discretion is both compelling and confounding. As early as 1935, John Willis famously urged scholars to attend to "what actually happens" in the context of administrative decision making. However, studying "what actually happens" is often harder than it sounds, and theorizing discretion in ways that move beyond a binary understanding of law/discretion is a daunting challenge. We believe this challenge can and should be addressed through interdisciplinary insights and dialogue.

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This article explores the possibility of critical theory as a framework for analysing public administration. Critical theory has a tradition of resisting the predominance of instrumental rationality as the building‐block for bureaucracy. The most sophisticated attempt at such an approach is the theory of communicative action developed by Jurgen Habermas. Adapting Habermas's theory to the realities of public administration in the welfare state, the author argues that current forms of administrative action are neither as rational nor as democratically legitimate as they could be. By relying on rules rather than on consensus, and by minimizing the participation of those affected by public administration, bureaucracy under the welfare state has resulted in a general loss of meaning within the public sphere and a high degree of social alienation. By focusing on the potential of discretionary decision‐making to foster a dialogue about the important judgments administrators make, it is possible to see the value of a critical approach to administrative structures. The author concludes by briefly exploring the application of a critical theory framework to the question of discretion in the context of Canadian tax administration. Sommaire: Cet article explore la possibilité d'utiliser la théorie critique comme cadre d'analyse de l'administration publique. Traditionnellement, la théorie critique tend à résister l'utilisation de la rationalité instrumentale en tant que pierre angulaire de la bureaucratie. La version la plus sophistiquée d'une telle approche est la théorie de l'action communicative élaborée par Jurgen Habermas. En adaptant la théorie de Habermas aux réalités de l'administration publique au sein de l'État‐providence, l'auteur soutient que les formes actuelles d'action administrative ne sont ni aussi rationnelles, ni aussi démocratiquement légitimes qu'elles pourraient l'être. En faisant appel aux règles plutôt qu'au consensus et en minimisant la participation de ceux qui sont touchés par l'action administrative, la bureaucratie, dans l'État‐providence, a entraîné une perte généralisée de sens et d'orientation dans le secteur public, ainsi qu'un niveau élevé d'aliénation sociale. En mettant l'accent sur le potentiel qu'offre la prise de décisions discrétionnaires pour amorcer le dialogue au sujet des jugements importants pris par les administrateurs, on conçoit la valeur que revêt une approche critique envers les structures administratives. L'auteur conclut en explorant brièvement l'application du cadre de théorie critique à la question de la discrétion dans le contexte de l'administraiton fiscale au Canada.

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The authors examine a number of examples of "soft law": written and unwritten instruments and influences which shape administrative decision- making. Rather than rendering bureaucratic processes more transparent and cohesive, or fostering greater accountability and consistency among decision-makers, "soft law" in this context frequently reinforces artificial divisions. Moreover, it insulates decisions and decision-makers from the kinds of critical inquiry typically associated with "hard law." If it is to realize its potential as a bridge between law and policy, and lend meaning to core principles — like fairness and reliability — soft law ought to be subjected to similarly critical consideration. The authors maintain that doing so allows one to preserve soft law's promise of flexibility. Moreover, one avoids falling prey to the misleading dichotomies soft law tends to bolster in the absence of critical administrative, political, and judicial scrutiny.