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Recent trade agreements have shifted their focus to non-tariff barriers such as regulations and product standards, which have been traditionally treated as pure domestic policies. The imposition of such standards reallocates production from small to large, high quality firms. We model regulations as a fixed cost that any firm selling to an economy must pay, consistent with stylized facts that we present. The fixed cost improves allocative efficiency, by reallocating production towards high-quality firms, who under-produce in the market allocation. Furthermore, the fixed cost generates a positive externality on the rest of the world as it induces entry of high-quality firms, but unilateral regulation lowers the terms of trade of the imposing country. The result justifies international cooperation based on the fact that such cooperation can improve welfare, rather than preventing negative consequences of tariff wars. We estimate our model and apply its gravity formulation to quantify the welfare consequences of imposing the optimal regulation, the extent of the positive externalities across countries, and the effects of cooperation.

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The author presents a model of international trade that features heterogeneous firms and asymmetric information on the quality of products, which is known to producers but unknown to consumers. The presence of asymmetric information leads to adverse selection whereby high-quality firms exit and only low-quality firms survive. The model shows that adverse selection also affects export participation as only firms with the lowest quality are able to export. For this reason, trade can lead to a reduction in welfare if it causes an average product quality reduction that is too substantial.The author studies the effects of two instruments: minimum quality standards, which force out firms with the lowest quality, and quality certifications, which allow firms to signal to consumers that their quality is higher than a certain threshold, upon payment of a fixed cost. Both instruments can improve welfare if the increase in prices associated with the higher-quality goods is small enough. Furthermore, the author studied how the two instruments interact with countries' openness.

I study the effects of entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU) on relative purchasing power parity (PPP) convergence using monthly disaggregated price indices from 32 European countries from 1999 to 2016. I examine the entry of Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the EMU, and I estimate the bands of inaction of relative prices before and after entry using a threshold autoregressive model. I find a positive effect of the EMU on relative PPP convergence: after entry, the bands of inaction with EMU members fell by 17 percent. Cross-sectional evidence supports the theoretical prediction that bands of inaction are related to transaction costs.