Using the replacement function associated with aggregative games, we analyze the expectational dynamics of the aggregate strategy of the game. We can interpret the Nash equilibrium of the game as the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of the system, and we examine the expectational stability of the REE. We characterize local stability in terms of fundamentals and the REE itself. We illustrate the results through well-known aggregative games (Cournot games, Bertrand competition with differentiated goods, rent seeking games, and the public goods provision game) and analyze their global expectational dynamics. * We would like to thank the participants of the 35 th Australasian Economic Theory Workshop for their helpful comments. Wilfredo L.

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I present a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets in which assets pay in units of a numéraire good. In this economy, agents are constrained to negotiate the same amount of assets in different states of the world. Different from the standard result of economies with real assets, equilibrium indeterminacy can arise, depending on the structure of the financial markets. Equilibrium fails to be unique when it is not possible to transfer wealth between states in which consumers trade a pair of assets that face the same restriction.

We prove the existence of a Circular Competitive Equilibrium (CCE), in a model of competitive equilibrium with restricted participation. The direction of trade is determined by the quotients of players' beliefs in consecutive states and the marginal rates of substitution calculated at initial endowments. We calculate wealth and belief e¤ects and provide su¢ cient conditions under which the CCE is unique. We prove that any CCE has the relevant e¢ ciency property.

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