Massimo Renzo argues that, as long as it is acting in good faith, an authority can issue orders that require subjects to act in ways that are morally wrong and still be acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, so that the orders are binding. This, however, is incorrect. If the authority is permitted to issue an order, it is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order creates an obligation. But if the authority is not permitted to issue the order, it is not acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order does not create any obligation whatsoever. I develop my position and provide a model of mistaken authority through engagement with Renzo's view.

In this paper, I will introduce the notions of crucial argument and crucial evidence in the philosophy of intellectual history (broadly construed, including the history of political thought). I will use these concepts and take sides in an important controversy in Hobbes studies, namely whether Hobbes holds a prudential or a deontological theory of contractual obligation. Though there is textual evidence for both readings, I will argue that there is especially relevant evidence – crucial evidence – for interpreting Hobbes’s account in a deontological fashion.

In this paper, I will show that Lloyd’s reading of Hobbes’s account of political obedience is substantially similar to the mainstream philosophical interpretation. In particular, both include an “orthodox” interpretation of Hobbes’s political and legal philosophy. On the orthodox interpretation, the reasonableness of a choice is determined by the “weight” or “balance” of reasons. Subjects have reason to obey the law because so acting best satisfies their different desires and interests. I will argue that the practical reasoning that takes into consideration transcendent interests, and the reasoning that takes into account mundane interests, are structurally similar. The difference between them lies in the fact that transcendent interests always outweigh other first-order considerations, whilst the relative weight of mundane interests always enters into a calculation of the “balance” of reasons to be assessed each time.

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