Owing to the fact that frontal regions of the brain are severely deactivated during sleep, there is a seeming inconsistency between the prominent Global Neuronal Workspace Theory of consciousness and the received view that dreams are vivid experiences occurring while sleeping. Indeed, based on the canonical criterion of reportability, Global Neuronal Workspace theorists claim that frontal activation of the brain is a necessary condition for conscious experience. Does it mean the received view is scientifically questionable? We argue the opposite way considering dreaming as a conscious experience that strikingly satisfies the current use of the canonical criterion though occurring under constraint of delayed reports. Further, this compelling condition of delayed report depends on a constitutional dissociation between experiencing and the cognitive mechanisms preparing report that proves very insightful. In line with recent findings from research on waking perception, this dissociation hints that Global Neuronal Workspace Theory is biased. Eventually, we discuss a recent claim according to which dreaming could "settle the debate opposing cognitive and noncognitive theories of consciousness."

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