No abstract

We develop and test the hypothesis that foreign direct investment promotes corporate governance spillovers in the host country. Using firm-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and corporate governance in 22 countries, we find that cross-border M&As are associated with subsequent improvements in the governance, valuation, and productivity of the target firms' local rivals. This positive spillover effect is stronger when the acquirer is from a country with stronger shareholder protection and if the target's industry is more competitive. We conclude that the international market for corporate control promotes the adoption of better corporate governance practices around the world. JEL Classification Numbers: G32, G34, G38

No abstract

Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees can affect the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of bank data and government support to banks for the periods 2003-2004 and 2009-2010. We find that more government support is associated with more risk-taking by banks, especially during the financial crisis (2009-10), even after controlling for several bank-specific and country-level factors. We use several measures of government support and bank risk-taking, and the results are robust to various possible misspecification issues. We also find that restricting banks' range of activities ameliorates the moral hazard problem. We propose that policy measures to counteract this moral hazard problem should be geared towards strengthening market discipline in the banking sector.JEL classifications: G21, G28, H81

Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees can affect the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of bank data and government support to banks for the periods 2003-2004 and 2009-2010. We find that more government support is associated with more risk-taking by banks, especially during the financial crisis (2009-10), even after controlling for several bank-specific and country-level factors. We use several measures of government support and bank risk-taking, and the results are robust to various possible misspecification issues. We also find that restricting banks' range of activities ameliorates the moral hazard problem. We conclude that policy measures to counteract this moral hazard problem should be geared towards strengthening market discipline in the banking sector.JEL classifications: G21, G28, H81