In Italy, the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of many elderly people have put in evidence the uneven territorial distribution of nursing homes, which have amplified the spread and severity of the pandemic. By applying a pooled OLS model to the Italian regions, over the 2010–18 period, we investigate the demand factors, market forces and institutional drivers of the spatial distribution of residential healthcare for the elderly. Using a fine-grained approach that considers specific regional and age-related elements and the market environment, which can reduce or increase the pressure on regional governments to provide formal assistance, we find that the financial resources and the availability of unemployed women as potential caregivers explain the distribution of expenditure better than the health needs of the elderly. As a result, the expenditure is concentrated in richer and more financially autonomous regions and it is not congruent with the distribution of chronicity, health and frailty factors or income among the elderly. These critical issues of the care services for frail elderly people, related to a highly decentralized governance and resulting in fragmented, market-driven provision, could be attacked only by a national reform.

Which are the institutional and constitutional settings that best reduce the tendency to manipulate fiscal forecasts? This paper addresses the question by examining the quality of fiscal forecasts at different stages of the budget process in 13 European Union countries by using annual forecast vintages (1999–2013) from Stability and Convergence Programmes. Both the role of political structures and the balance of power between the executive and the legislature are assessed as determinants of systematic forecasting errors. The findings suggest that the forecasting bias is more effectively countered in presidential and semi/presidential systems, in parliamentary systems with strong bicameralism and when executive/legislature relations are constrained by checks and balances. Confirmation of these results is also provided by linking our approach to the fiscal institutionalist approach based on the form of fiscal governance and the stringency of fiscal rules. In terms of institutional capacity, if fiscal rules and legislative organizational and research capacity counter the executive’s monopoly of fiscal forecasting, strengthening the legislature’s formal powers negatively influences the fiscal forecast accuracy. Indeed, strategic considerations may induce the executive to anticipate the legislature’s amendment or rejection of the tabled budget by means of more favourable economic and fiscal assumptions. The crisis and its urgencies crisis seem to have weakened the effect of institutional executive/legislature relations on fiscal forecast accuracy

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

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Based on four decades (1973–2013) of OECD‐Development Assistance Committee aid to developing countries, this article aims to show aid‐financed global public goods trends, their changing composition and their main drivers. In particular, a constant increase in the share of aid‐financed global public goods and a shift towards weighted‐sum and weakest‐link global goods are observed. Economic conditions, imitation effects, global engagement and domestic spending result as the main drivers of donors’ demand for aid‐financed global public goods. Besides, a certain complementarity in the provision of global goods plays a role, especially in European countries and Japan, partially easing the prognosis for the collective action problems related to global goods