This study reviews the existing literature on the U.S. peer review system and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection system to assess our knowledge of audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the accounting profession came to an end, in 2002, when the PCAOB was established to oversee the audit firms of publicly traded companies. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about self-regulation versus independent regulation by analyzing, categorizing, and comparing the research findings on the peer review system and the PCAOB system along three dimensions: the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the recognition of reviews and inspections by decision-makers (e.g. investors, bankers, committees), and the effect of reviews and inspections on audit quality. Synthesizing the research on the regulatory regimes suggests that the notion of external quality control, both through peer reviews and government inspections, is positively linked with an improvement of audit quality. At the same time, the analysis indicates that external users do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB reports as very useful instruments for decision-making, which is in line with an identified rather skeptical perception of the audit profession on reviews and inspections. Overall, this study reveals that although the academic literature on peer review and PCAOB inspection is extensive it has not produced definitive conclusions concerning various aspects of audit regulation. This paper shows how this blurred picture is due to conflicting research findings, the dominance of the quantitative research paradigm, and unchallenged assumptions within the literature, and concludes by proposing research opportunities for the future.

No abstract

No abstract

This paper examines professional associations' local responses to global demands of accounting standardisation. Our longitudinal study from 1998 to 2018 analyses how professional associations of the German audit profession engaged in an intense framing contest over the adoption of external quality controls. Drawing on the concept of strategic action field and the literature on framing, we unpack how the gap between large audit firms and small audit firms increasingly undermined the capacity of the professional associations to fulfil their dual role of governance and representation. We unveil how their failed attempt to maintain the image of an unified profession ultimately led to the creation of a new professional association representing the 'small auditor' professional, which successfully, albeit temporarily, took control over the field of German auditing. Our findings suggest that the passivity of small audit firms in the process of translating global regulatory regimes should not be presumed. Rather, we provide insight into how small audit firms can rebuild their own identity by actively responding to waves of global regulation. Doing so, and contrary to prior research, our case highlights that governance units within strategic action fields are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the most powerful field actors.

No abstract