The History of Knowledge and the Future History of Ignorance lukas m. verburgt, utrecht university, netherlands From the History of Science to the History of Knowledge and Beyond Since recently, the history of knowledge is flourishing: it has its own centers-in Berlin and Chicago, for instance, as well as in Zurich, Lund, Washington, DC, and Cambridge-its own journals, and its own conferences. Together, these offer a new forum for debate about topics, concepts, methods, and the relation of history to other disciplines that place knowledge at the heart of research. This debate is now well underway, and so far it has been organized around three main questions: What is the history of knowledge? How can it be studied? And where should we go from here? 1 Although there are different routes into the field, and different national traditions in America, England, Germany, France, and the Nordic region, the history of knowledge is widely seen as a mere expansion of the older discipline of the history of science. 2 Some have portrayed it as nothing more (and nothing less) than the culmination

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The goal of this paper is to provide a detailed reading of John Venn's Logic of Chance (1866) as a work of logic or, more specifically, as a specific portion of the general system of so-called 'material' logic developed in his Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic (1889) and to discuss it against the background of his Boolean-inspired views on the connection between logic and mathematics. It is by means of this situating of Venn 1866 [The Logic of Chance. An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability. With Especial Reference to Its Application to Moral and Social Science, London: Macmillan] within the entirety of his oeuvre that it becomes both possible to revisit and necessary to re-articulate its place in the history of the frequency interpretation of probability. For it is clear that if Venn's approach to logic not only allowed him to establish its foundations on the basis of a process of idealization and define it as consisting of so-called hypothetical infinite series, but also brought him to do so in strictly non-mathematical terms, he was able to anticipate much of the content (and problems) of his twentieth-century fellow frequentists.