According to embodied cognition theories, higher cognitive abilities depend on the reenactment of sensory and motor representations. In the first part of this review, we critically analyze the central claims of embodied theories and argue that the existing behavioral and neuroimaging data do not allow investigators to discriminate between embodied cognition and classical cognitive accounts, which assume that conceptual representations are amodal and symbolic. In the second part, we review the main claims and the core electrophysiological findings typically cited in support of the mirror neuron theory of action understanding, one of the most influential examples of embodied cognition theories. In the final part, we analyze the claim that mirror neurons subserve action understanding by mapping visual representations of observed actions on motor representations, trying to clarify in what sense the representations carried by these neurons can be claimed motor.

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Visual cues from the face and the body provide information about another's identity, emotional state, and intentions. Previous neuroimaging studies that investigated neural responses to (bodiless) faces and (headless) bodies have reported overlapping face- and body-selective brain regions in right fusiform gyrus (FG). In daily life, however, faces and bodies are typically perceived together and are effortlessly integrated into the percept of a whole person, raising the possibility that neural responses to whole persons are qualitatively different than responses to isolated faces and bodies. The present study used fMRI to examine how FG activity in response to a whole person relates to activity in response to the same face and body but presented in isolation. Using multivoxel pattern analysis, we modeled person-evoked response patterns in right FG through a linear combination of face- and body-evoked response patterns. We found that these synthetic patterns were able to accurately approximate the response patterns to whole persons, with face and body patterns each adding unique information to the response patterns evoked by whole person stimuli. These results suggest that whole person responses in FG primarily arise from the coactivation of independent face- and body-selective neural populations.