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In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a ''natural'' hedge. D

We present a new approach to test empirically the financial distress costs theory of corporate hedging. We estimate the ex-ante expected financial distress costs, which serve as a starting point to construct further explanatory variables in an equilibrium setting, as a fraction of the value of an asset-or-nothing put option on the firm's assets. Using single-contract data of the derivatives' use of 189 German middle-market companies that stems from a major bank as well as Basel II default probabilities and historical accounting information, we are able to explain a significant share of the observed cross-sectional differences in hedge ratios. Hence, our analysis adds further support for the financial distress costs theory of corporate hedging from the perspective of a financial intermediary.

This paper develops a theory of a firm’s hedging decision with endogenous leverage. In contrast to previous models in the literature, our framework is based on less restrictive distributional assumptions and allows a closed-form analytical solution to the joint optimization problem. Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk management for firms selling “credence goods” or products that involve long-term relationships, we prove that those optimally leveraged firms, which face more convex indirect bankruptcy cost functions, will choose higher hedge ratios. Moreover, we suggest a new approach to test this relationship empirically. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Corporate hedging, Risk management, Leverage, Capital structure, Bankruptcy, Financial distress, G32, G39,

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