Extraordinary growth in managed care arrangements over the past decade has been both widely praised and criticized. Proponents and critics agree that the nature of medical practice is being profoundly altered by this growth, even if they cannot articulate the direction and consequences of this change. We explore the roots of this uncertainty by examining the available evidence on critical features of the arrangements managed care plans currently have with affiliated physicians. Our approach is to review and synthesize the literature in several key substantive areas from a broad range of sources. We found that existing knowledge is dated, derived form a limited subset of plans, inattentive to important structural differences between plans, and responsive to a very narrow set of issues poorly reflecting the range of medical practice and change introduced by managed care. We highlight key questions of interest and the knowledge gaps critical to address so that policy and management decisions can both reflect and be informed on these issues that define the arrangements managed care plans make with physicians and ultimately influence medical practice.

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The prices that private insurers pay hospitals have received considerable attention in recent years, but most of that literature has focused on the commercially insured population. Although nearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan, little is known about the prices paid to hospitals by the private insurers that administer such plans. More information on the hospital prices paid by MA plans would provide additional insights into whether MA prices are more closely tied to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) prices or commercial prices. Moreover, information on whether the hospital prices paid by MA plans vary with market characteristics or other factors would be useful for evaluating the performance of the MA program and analyzing proposals to modify it. In this study, we compared the hospital prices paid by MA plans and commercial plans with Medicare FFS prices using 2013 claims from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) database. The HCCI claims were used to calculate hospital prices for private insurers, and Medicare’s payment rules were used to estimate Medicare FFS prices. We focused on stays at acute care hospitals in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We found MA prices to be roughly equal to Medicare FFS prices, on average, but commercial prices were 89% higher than FFS prices. In addition, commercial prices varied greatly across and within MSAs, but MA prices varied much less.

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We assess the potential of increased economic competition by examining whether Medicare beneficiaries are willing to switch to physicians who agree to accept all services on assignment. Data come from a survey of Medicare beneficiaries conducted in November 1988. Our principal finding is that beneficiaries are not sensitive to price when making decisions about whether or not to switch physicians. Less than one-half of 1 percent of the sample had switched physicians for economic reasons in the year prior to the survey. Furthermore, willingness to switch was not correlated with ability to pay. We conclude that policies aimed at altering consumer demand may not be the most effective way to control Medicare costs.