Patient-subjects reported that they can, at least partially, control the benefits they receive from participating in an early-phase oncology trial. This sense of control may underlie unrealistic optimism about benefiting personally from trial participation. Effective interventions to counteract unrealistic optimism may need to address the psychological factors that give rise to distorted risk/benefit processing.

In the recent medical ethics literature, several authors have recommended terminal sedation and refusal of hydration and nutrition as important, morally acceptable, and relatively uncontroversial treatment options for end-of-life suffering. However, not all authors use these terms to refer to the same practices. This paper examines the various ways that the terms terminal sedation and refusal of hydration and nutrition have been used in the medical literature. Although some of these practices are ethically appropriate responses to end-of-life suffering, others (at least as they are currently described in the medical ethics literature) are not. This paper identifies and discusses the principles that morally distinguish these practices from one another and specifically describes different features of medical practices and moral principles that affect the moral acceptability of various medical treatments. These distinctions reveal the complexity of the issues surrounding terminal sedation and refusal of hydration and nutrition, a complexity that has not been adequately addressed in recent discussions.

Researchers and ethicists have long been concerned about the expectations for direct medical benefit expressed by participants in early phase clinical trials. Early work on the issue considered the possibility that participants misunderstand the purpose of clinical research or that they are misinformed about the prospects for medical benefit from these trials. Recently, however, attention has turned to the possibility that research participants are simply expressing optimism or hope about their participation in these trials. The ethical significance of this therapeutic optimism remains unclear. This paper argues that there are two distinct phenomena that can be associated with the term ‘therapeutic optimism’—one is ethically benign and the other is potentially worrisome. Distinguishing these two phenomena is crucial for understanding the nature and ethical significance of therapeutic optimism. The failure to draw a distinction between these phenomena also helps to explain why different writers on the topic often speak past one another.

Purpose Prior research has identified unrealistic optimism as a bias that might impair informed consent among patient-subjects in early phase oncology trials. Optimism, however, is not a unitary construct – it can also be defined as a general disposition, or what is called dispositional optimism. We assessed whether dispositional optimism would be related to high expectations for personal therapeutic benefit reported by patient-subjects in these trials but not to the therapeutic misconception. We also assessed how dispositional optimism related to unrealistic optimism. Methods Patient-subjects completed questionnaires designed to measure expectations for therapeutic benefit, dispositional optimism, unrealistic optimism, and the therapeutic misconception. Results Dispositional optimism was significantly associated with higher expectations for personal therapeutic benefit (Spearman r=0.333, p<0.0001), but was not associated with the therapeutic misconception. (Spearman r=−0.075, p=0.329). Dispositional optimism was weakly associated with unrealistic optimism (Spearman r=0.215, p=0.005). In multivariate analysis, both dispositional optimism (p=0.02) and unrealistic optimism (p<0.0001) were independently associated with high expectations for personal therapeutic benefit. Unrealistic optimism (p=.0001), but not dispositional optimism, was independently associated with the therapeutic misconception. Conclusion High expectations for therapeutic benefit among patient-subjects in early phase oncology trials should not be assumed to result from misunderstanding of specific information about the trials. Our data reveal that these expectations are associated with either a dispositionally positive outlook on life or biased expectations about specific aspects of trial participation. Not all manifestations of optimism are the same, and different types of optimism likely have different consequences for informed consent in early phase oncology research.