Purpose Using a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue. Findings The main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value. Research limitations/implications Although the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance. Originality/value First, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.

This paper examines the sources of pre‐bid announcement abnormal returns (ARs) accruing to target companies’ shareholders. To control for publicly available information, targets are classified as either identified or unidentified. The paper finds that prior disclosure of bid related information does give rise to pre‐bid ARs. For identified targets there is no evidence that these ARs arise from trading on unpublished price sensitive information. For unidentified targets, trading on unpublished price sensitive information may give rise to ARs, although these ARs could be explained by stakebuilding. ARs do not occur prior to the first bid news item, a result contrary to previous US studies.

The motives for takeovers in the UK are investigated by examining the correlations between wealth gains for the target and both acquirer wealth gains and total wealth gains. The results are sensitive to whether the gains are measured over a long or short window, the method of measuring abnormal returns, and whether controls are included for the form of the bid consideration and the sign of total bid gains. There is evidence of bids motivated by synergy, but there is also evidence of the presence of hubris and weak evidence of bids with an agency motivation. Once controls for bid consideration and the sign of total gains are introduced the explanatory power of the models increases substantially and diversity of results about bid motivation also increases. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.