Recent research has shown a memory advantage for minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concepts, over concepts that are either intuitive (INT) or maximally counterintuitive (MXCI), although the general result is heavily affected by context. Items from one such study were given to subjects who were asked to create novel stories using at least three concepts from a list containing all three types. Results indicated a preference for using MCI items (as in the recall studies), and further disclosed two styles of usage, an accommodative style and an assimilative style. The results extend recent memory research and suggest extensions to recent theories intended to explain the prevalence of counterintuitive religious concepts.For some years now, cognitive attempts to understand the pervasiveness and universality of religious belief have relied heavily upon "Minimal Counterintuitiveness" as an explanation for why certain concepts are easy to remember and transmit. According to this view, concepts that violate a limited number of the ontological expectations of folk biology, 1 The present paper is the outcome of a short-lived informal research group, the "I-75 Culture & Cognition Group." The authors are indebted to the staff of the Grounds for Thought coffee house, Bowling Green, Ohio, for providing a stimulating and comfortable environment during which these ideas were formulated and discussed.

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This article reports an investigation involving a series of studies carried out to critically examine the hypothesis that presence of 2 or 3 minimally counterintuitive concepts in a story makes it more memorable than stories containing fewer or more of such concepts. The results paint a more complicated picture involving a number of interacting factors with contribution of the counterintuitive concepts to the global story cohesion emerging as a key mediating factor. It was found that addition of counterintuitive concepts only makes stories more memorable if those concepts contribute to the global cohesion of the overall story.

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Traditionally cognitive scientists have had little to say about religion (and even less to say about new religious movements (NRMs)) partly because religion is arguably a social phenomenon (Bainbridge et al. 1994) and partly because of the pervasive scientific bias of relegating religion to the heap of the irrational, the illogical, and 'a fading vestige of the prescientific times' (Lewis 2003). While sociologists of religion have been studying NRMs, their analysis has been limited to the macro-level. Recent trends in sociology and economics focused on the so called rational choice theories (Iannaccone 1998) and in cognitive sciences of religion (Barrett 2000; Boyer 2001) offer the hope of moving in the direction of a more complete explanation of emergence of new religious movements by providing both macro and micro level analyses. I believe that a closer interaction between these two developments is possible, indeed necessary, for the development of a scientific theory of NRMs that weds the macro and the micro levels. I illustrate the benefits of this approach by focusing on a hitherto ignored phenomenon, the emergence of charismatic leaders who inspire new religious movements. The primary aim of this paper is to identify the contextual factors (both social and cognitive) that cause self-interested utility maximizing agents to take actions that result in new religious movements (NRM). Our secondary aim is to identify factors that cause other self interested utility maximizing agents to align themselves with NRM founders and become the believers. I illustrate how various tools of cognitive science including computer modeling can help in this regard.