Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10091.pdf Non-technical summaryBasic income schemes are discussed among all political parties in Germany. A basic income is a specific form of a guaranteed minimum income for every citizen. Distributed unconditionally it could simplify the current German welfare state by replacing the numerous means-tested welfare transfers. The proposed basic income schemes combine several different instruments like a negative income tax, a flat tax system and lump sum payments for health insurance. The concepts discussed differ in crucial design parameters mainly in the level of guaranteed income.We focus our analysis on the prominent proposal by the conservative party (Christian Democratic Union -CDU). By introducing their proposal of an unconditional basic income, all means-tested social transfers would be replaced by a negative income tax scheme that guarantees every citizen a minimum income, regardless of whether he or she is in work or unemployed. Social security payments would be substituted by a payroll tax for employers and a tax-financed basic pension would replace the current pension scheme. The transfer withdrawal rate would be considerably reduced to 50% and a flat tax rate of 25% is suggested.Our paper analyzes the effects of the proposed basic income reform and two budget-neutral alternatives on labor supply and income distribution. A special focus lies on the work incentives for secondary earners in the family context. We use a detailed microsimulation model for the German tax system to simulate the reform and a structural household labor supply model for the estimations. The analyses are based on the micro data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).Our results show that the originally proposed basic income concept yields a very high deficit. Therefore, we also study two budget neutral alternatives. Introducing the originally proposed reform, our model predicts a large increase of labor supply due to high working incentives caused by the low tax rate. But raising the tax rate in order to meet the criteria of budget neutrality, labor supply adjustments turn negative. By comparing labor supply and distributional effects of the budget neutral alternatives, we observe that positive labor supply reactions coincide with increasing inequality, which indicates the general equity-efficiency trade-off. Furthermore, the unconditional character of the basic income causes especially...

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08006.pdf Non-technical summaryWe estimate the effects of the introduction of the Unemployment Benefit II (UBII) as reform of the German Unemployment Insurance that replaced the wage related UnemploymentAssistance with an income maintenance program and stronger means testing.We model the German tax-benefit system and use the waves of the German SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP) for 2004 and 2005. We define the "Group A" as people who are "Affected" by the reform. Within this Group A, we also subsume people who were not eligible to any benefits in the status quo and who become eligible after the reform.The aim of the paper is twofold. First we are interested in the distributional effects of the reform for the entire population and for several subgroups. Second, we estimate a discrete labour supply model to estimate the labour supply effects. Furthermore we use the estimation results to simulate the distributional effects that correspond to the labour supply effects by applying the pseudo-distribution method.The introduction of UB II has led to a consolidation of the benefit system. The presumption that people who used to receive high UA-benefits because they had higher earnings (before unemployment) are losing most is confirmed. We find that six deciles (seven deciles) are losing income as a consequence of the reform with consideration of behavioural effects (without behavioural effects). We identify reform winners in the subgroups of (1) former recipients of social assistance and of (2) new recipients. The largest gains accrue to households with many children and to households who have not been eligible for any benefits before. These households become eligible, because of the less restrictive non-earned-income test compared to the old social assistance. For the whole group of benefit recipients, namely "Group A", we find a reduction of the income inequality accompanied by a positive effect on the poverty measures. This effect is in line with the theoretical considerations. The new benefit system has a tendency to equalize the transfer payments on a level that is slightly higher than the old social assistance level.These results are also confirmed by the labour supply effects. We find negative participation effects for women with children in couple and single households. In the opposite, couples without children, single men and women without children increase their participation. T...

Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp09062.pdfNon-technical summary:Ex ante evaluation of policy reform proposals in general relies either on microsimulation models or computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. This paper describes how the Centre of European Economic Research (ZEW) has merged two established models -the so-called STSM and PACE-L models -in order to obtain a linked microsimulationcomputable general equilibrium model. This state of the art approach for applied policy analysis combines the advantages of the two model types.Concerning microsimulation models, their main advantage is the foundation on individual household level data. This allows a detailed analysis of who gains and who loses from a reform proposal. The main disadvantage of microsimulation models is that they neglect general equilibrium effects. In particular, these models assume constant wages and interest rates. i.e. that the labour market equilibrium is the same before and after the analyzed policy change. CGE models, on the other hand, incorporate these effects.. Their disadvantage ist that they are based on aggregated household types rather than individ- On the one hand, microsimulation models allow for detailed labor supply and distributional effects due to policy measures, as individual household data is used. On the other hand, by using a general equilibrium framework, labour market responses, such as wage and labour demand reactions are taken into account.Keywords: microsimulation, applied CGE analysis, linked micro-macro models JEL Code: C68, C81, D58, J22, J23 ______________________________Corresponding author: Markus Clauss, ZEW, L7,1, D-68161 Mannheim, e-mail: clauss@zew.de.We thank Asghar Zaidi, Ann Harding, Heidi Hellerich, and Markus Becker for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

The particle size distribution of airborne bacterial conglomerates is an important factor in calculating possible spread distances of the bacteria over the air. Therefore, a size-selective collection system based on an emission impinger was developed to compare the distribution of total bacteria and staphylococci in particle fractions PM2.5, PM10 and total dust in the emission of two fattening pig stables. Mean emissions of 7.2 × 104 cfu/m³ total bacteria, 6.1 × 104 cfu/m³ staphylococci and 2.8 × 106 cells/m3 measured. About 30% of total bacteria and staphylococci were found in the PM2.5 particle size fraction and about 60% in PM10. The average dust distribution was 80% PM10 and 60% PM2.5. The results show that airborne bacteria from fattening pig units mainly occur on larger particles and do not correlate with dust fractions. The found conditions should be considered in future dispersion modelling.