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Deterrence, the hallmark of Cold War-era security, needs to be adapted to fit the more volatile security environment of the 21 st century. The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced military competitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and nonstate terrorist networks-while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors.The goal of deterrence is to prevent aggressive action or WMD use by ensuring that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of the action outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of inaction.Deterrence requires detailed knowledge of the society and leadership that we seek to influence. U.S. decisionmakers will need a continuing set of comprehensive country or group deterrence assessments, drawing on expertise in and out of government, in order to tailor deterrence to specific actors and specific situations.The capabilities needed for tailored deterrence go beyond nuclear weapons and the strategic capabilities of the so-called New Triad, to the full range of military capabilities, presence, and cooperation, as well as diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments.The clarity and credibility of American messages in the mind of the deterree are critical to tailoring deterrence threats. U.S. policymakers need mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect each adversary's deterrence calculations, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that undermine deterrence. North Korea's nuclear weapons test is only the latest illustration of how dramatically the international security environment has changed over the last 15 years. Given the wider variety of actors that could inflict mass casualties upon the United States, its allies, or its interests, it makes sense to explore whether and how deterrence could be adapted, adjusted, and made to fit 21 st -century challenges.In its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, the Bush administration set forth a vision for tailored deterrence, continuing a shift from a one-size-fits-all notion of deterrence toward more adaptable approaches suitable for advanced military competitors, regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) states, as well as nonstate terrorist networks, while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. 1 The QDR was the first official U.S. public document to use the term tailored deterrence. But the QDR did not explain in much detail what the newly coined term means or how it might be achieved. This has led to a number of questions: How does tailored deterrence differ from previous strategies? Whom is the United States trying to deter, from doing what, and in what circumstances? What does one need to know in order to deter in each case? How should capabilities be tailored for deterrence? How can the United States tailor deterrence when, given global communications, messages tailored to one audience will be received by all?Deterrence aims to ...

By October 2004, the United States will have begun initial deployment of a missile defense capability-albeit a modest, limited, and not completely proven one-to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack.The gradual phase-in of ballistic missile defense deployments will mark an important change in the policy context of the missile defense issue. Past debate focused on whether missile defenses should be deployed and whether they would work. These issues will now share the limelight with another pressing question: how would missile defenses actually be used? Operating a missile defense system presents seven challenges: To manage the transition to defense, policy guidance to address these challenges will have to be somewhat flexible; it will likely evolve over time, based on the evolution of the system as well as operational experience and future testing using varied assumptions and scenarios.If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2004, the United States will deploy eight groundbased midcourse defense (GMD) interceptors 1 in Alaska and California, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and the command and control systems to support the interceptors. By the end of 2005, 12 more GMD interceptors will be added, along with additional sensors and interceptor missiles on Navy ships.The initial deployments of 2004-2005 are only the first step on the path to the Bush administration goal of an integrated, global missile defense 2 to protect the United States, its friends and allies, and deployed forces against limited attacks by ballistic missiles of all ranges (short-, medium-, intermediate-, and longrange) in all phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal).

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