Corporate elite studies have for long investigated networks of interlocking directorates to test and corroborate key theoretical expectations regarding the cohesive organization of such an elite and their ability and willingness to act on behalf of general business interests. These studies typically collect data on a list of 50, 100, 200 or 500 corporations ranked by economic size, sometimes stratified in sectors. The sampling approach often follows previous studies in order to increase comparability. These relatively arbitrary sampling practices are problematic because they impact the empirical results and our therefore the conclusions drawn from it. Using a sample of 3251 Canada‐based corporations, we establish that indeed different sampling criteria – that is sample size, proportion of financial firms, inclusion of state‐owned enterprises and so on – significantly impacts network properties of corporate elite networks. We establish rather disturbing differences, especially for smaller sample sizes (<100). Subsequently, we develop alternative demarcation criteria of the corporate elite based on a k‐core decomposition. We conclude by emphasizing that the sampling decisions in interlocking directorate studies should much more be carefully be thought through in future research on the topic, both in corporate elite studies and beyond.

The global financial crisis of 2008, its following bank bailouts, and associated corporate impunity sparked a renewed interest in the concept of the structural power of business and the question of “who rules?” in capitalist societies. This new wave of scholarship mitigated some of the problems of the original, theory-driven discussions from the 1970s and 1980s. But despite significant advancements in the empirical identification of business power, we lack a unified framework for studying its working mechanisms. So-called hybrid approaches, drawing on instrumental and structural power for their analyses, display high potential for such a unified and easily applicable framework. We build on this hybrid tradition and propose a novel model that integrates instrumental and structural power analysis into a basic framework. With this, we recalibrate the often rigid division between instrumental and structural power forms and emphasize the role of perceptions as key for understanding the dynamics of business power over time. We illustrate this parsimonious framework by an analysis of the plans of the Dutch government to abolish a dividend tax in 2018 that would have benefited a number of large multinationals but collapsed before implementation.

Conventional studies on left-wing decline focus primarily on the electoral losses of left-wing parties. This contribution argues that left wing decline should not only be understood in terms of support, but also in terms of ideological positioning. The Left may be in decline because of electoral support or because left-wing parties cease to be Left. More fundamentally the Left may be in decline because left-wing ideologies no longer inform public policy or shape political conflict, which points to a more metapolitical shift in “hegemonic ideology”. Taking this into account has important implications for understanding Left decline (and eventual revival). As will be demonstrated in six different scenarios, the Left may decline because of electoral shifts to the right or because parties reposition themselves to the right. Reviving the Left therefore not only implies that Left-wing parties win back voters, but it can also be achieved on a so-called metapolitical level: by shifting ideological positions or even hegemonic ideology to the Left. It is argued that especially with regard to shifting ideological positions, smaller parties in the political margins play a crucial role. The article concludes by discussing the implications and challenges for different political parties as well as the way in which political scientists can more comprehensively assess Left decline.