No abstract

Identifying statistical patterns between environmental stimuli enables organisms to respond adaptively when cues are later observed. However, stimuli are often obscured from detection, necessitating behavior under conditions of ambiguity. Considerable evidence indicates decisions under ambiguity rely on inference processes that draw on past experiences to generate predictions under novel conditions. Despite the high demand for this process and the observation that it deteriorates disproportionately with age, the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We developed a rodent model of decision-making during ambiguity to examine features of experience that contribute to inference. Rats learned either a simple (positive patterning) or complex (negative patterning) instrumental discrimination between the illumination of one or two lights. During test, only one light was lit while the other relevant light was blocked from physical detection (covered by an opaque shield, rendering its status ambiguous). We found experience with the complex negative patterning discrimination was necessary for rats to behave sensitively to the ambiguous test situation. These rats behaved as if they inferred the presence of the hidden light, responding differently than when the light was explicitly absent (uncovered and unlit). Differential expression profiles of the immediate early gene cFos indicated hippocampal involvement in the inference process while localized microinfusions of the muscarinic antagonist, scopolamine, into the dorsal hippocampus caused rats to behave as if only one light was present. That is, blocking cholinergic modulation prevented the rat from inferring the presence of the hidden light. Collectively, these results suggest cholinergic modulation mediates recruitment of hippocampal processes related to past experiences and transfer of these processes to make decisions during ambiguous situations. Our results correspond with correlations observed between human brain function and inference abilities, suggesting our experiments may inform interventions to alleviate or prevent cognitive dysfunction.

Pavlovian trace conditioning critically depends on the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and hippocampus (HPC), whereas delay conditioning does not depend on these brain structures. Given that the cholinergic basal forebrain system modulates activity in both the mPFC and HPC, it was reasoned that the level of acetylcholine (ACh) release in these regions would show distinct profiles during testing in trace and delay conditioning paradigms. To test this assumption, microdialysis probes were implanted unilaterally into the mPFC and HPC of rats that were pre-trained in appetitive trace and delay conditioning paradigms using different conditional stimuli in the two tasks. On the day of microdialysis testing, dialysate samples were collected during a quiet baseline interval before trials were initiated, and again during performance in separate blocks of trace and delay conditioning trials in each animal. ACh levels were quantified using high performance liquid chromatography and electrochemical detection techniques. Consistent with our hypothesis, results showed that ACh release in the mPFC was greater during trace conditioning than during delay conditioning. The level of ACh released during trace conditioning in the HPC was also greater than the levels observed during delay conditioning. While ACh efflux in both the mPFC and HPC selectively increased during trace conditioning, ACh levels in the mPFC during trace conditioning testing showed the greatest increases observed. These results demonstrate a dissociation in cholinergic activation of the mPFC and HPC during performance in trace but not delay appetitive conditioning, where this cholinergic activity may contribute to attentional mechanisms, adaptive response timing, or memory consolidation necessary for successful trace conditioning.