Max Weber's theoretical constitution of sociological ideal types is examined, and a number of key elements and characteristics of such types are identified. Additionally, several common misconceptions with respect to Weber's sociological types are clarified, including the erroneous assumption that his sociological ideal types were formulated on an ad hoc basis, as well as the common complaint that these types are overly abstract and more suited to classification than explanation. By combining Weber's methodological discussions of the ideal type with examples taken from his substantive studies, Weber's sociological ideal types are shown to have been constructed as integrated components of theoretical schemes which, when applied to an empirical context, provide comprehensive explanations. KeywordsAction, explanation, ideal type, meaning, reality of life, social relationship, theoretical scheme, Weber This article examines Max Weber's sociological ideal types in order to provide a systematic exposition of the theoretical constitution and characteristics of such types. Although there is already a substantial body of literature devoted to the examination of Weber's ideal types, much of it is focused on epistemological issues such as concept formation, validity and value 'relevance' (see, for example,

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Erving Goffman’s posthumously published essay, ‘The interaction order’, which was to have been presented as a presidential address at an annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, is usually taken to be an attempt at a systematic summary by Goffman of his key ideas. This article suggests the address can also be understood as a profoundly personal and deeply scornful critique by Goffman of the varieties of mainstream sociology and the pretensions of its practitioners. Incorporated into that critique is a simulacrum in which Goffman demonstrated what a systematic treatment of his work might look like had he actually been inclined to generate one. In that respect, ‘The interaction order’ transcends the boundaries of what we ordinarily expect to find in an academic address: it is simultaneously an artful display of Goffman’s real vocational commitment to sociology, a contribution to the rhetorical debate in which he engaged with the practitioners of orthodox versions of sociology and a brief but significant demonstration of some aspects he considered distinctive about his own form of sociology.

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