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Abstract. Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto e‰cient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto e‰-cient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule.

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Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality. We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of sharing rules.

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