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Despite lab-based evidence supporting the argument that double standardsby which one group is unfairly held to stricter standards than another-explain observed gender differences in evaluations, it remains unclear whether double standards also affect evaluations in organization and market contexts, where competitive pressures create a disincentive to discriminate. Using data from a field study of investment professionals sharing recommendations on an online platform, and drawing on status theory, we identify the conditions under which double standards in multistage evaluations contribute to unequal outcomes for men and women. We find that double standards disadvantaging women are most likely when evaluators face heightened search costs related to the number of candidates being compared or higher levels of uncertainty stemming from variation in the amount of pertinent information available. We rule out that systematic gender differences in the actions or characteristics of the investment professionals being evaluated are driving these results. By more carefully isolating the role of this status-based mechanism of discrimination for perpetuating gender inequality, this study identifies not only whether but also the conditions under which gender-based double standards lead to a female disadvantage, even when relevant and objective information about performance is readily available.

While most research explaining the persistence of gender inequality has focused on how decision makers’ own biases perpetuate inequities, a growing body of work points to mechanisms of bias that may arise when a decision maker is concerned with satisfying a third party or audience. Using data from 2007 to 2013 on 2,310 members of a popular networking organization for entrepreneurs, I examine the extent to which the presence of third parties leads to gender inequality in resource exchange, or connections to potential clients. I show that decision makers are most apt to favor male network contacts in exchanges involving a third party when considering whether to connect a contact in a male-typed occupation. Decision makers do not display this gender bias in exchanges that do not involve a third party or when sharing connections to potential clients with contacts in gender-neutral or female-typed occupations. This setting offers a unique opportunity to compare gender inequality in exchanges involving a third party with cases that do not involve a third party, providing direct evidence of the effects of audiences or third parties for gender inequality.

The extent to which men and women sort into different jobs and organizations—namely, gender differences in supply-side labor market processes—is a key determinant of workplace gender composition. This study draws on theories of congruence to uncover a unique organization-level driver of gender differences in job seekers’ behavior. We first argue and show that congruence between leadership gender and organizational claims is a key mechanism that drives job seekers’ interest. Specifically, many organizational claims are gender-typed, such that social claims activate the female stereotype, whereas business claims activate the male stereotype. Thus, whereas female-led organizations making social claims are gender-congruent, male-led firms making the same claims are gender-incongruent. Beyond demonstrating a general preference among job seekers for congruence, we also find that female job seekers are most interested in working for organizations that are simultaneously congruent and provide credible signals that they are fair and equitable employers. The congruence of leadership gender and organizational claims thus affects the gender composition of applicant pools for otherwise identical jobs.

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