The article employs hand-collected data on 14 board characteristics for the period from 2004–2005 to 2016–2017 to empirically assess the evolution of board governance practices in the Indian banking industry. For this, we construct a comprehensive index for board governance and four sub-indices of board effectiveness. The study sheds light on how various characteristics of Indian bank boards have evolved over time. The mean value of the board index rose 33 per cent during the period of analysis, indicating a significant improvement in board governance practices of banks. The improvement in practices is primarily due to a considerable transition in the sub-dimensions of board structures and board independence. The transition in board structure results from the larger number of banks appointing different persons as CEOs and chairpersons; the change in board independence has principally emanated from the larger number of banks providing training to their independent directors, declarations and conducting separate meetings. Yet, our findings recommend room for further improvement in various aspects of board governance, including appointment of non-executive chairpersons, female directors and board independence. JEL Classification: G21, G34, C23

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This study econometrically tests the ‘substitution’ versus ‘outcome’ hypotheses by examining the impact of board governance on the dividend payout policy in the Indian banking industry. The analysis is confined to the period from 2005 to 2018. The results reveal a significant positive influence of overall board quality on the magnitude of payouts, supporting the ‘outcome hypothesis’. At the disaggregated level, independent directors, female directors, chief executive officer duality, and board meetings significantly influence the dividend policy of Indian banks. Our further investigation of the board‐dividend nexus at the ownership level shows that this complement relation is only visible in private banks (PBs). While the ‘substitution hypothesis’ holds in public sector banks (PSBs). The results suggest that good governed PBs use dividends as a complementary measure of monitoring mechanism. In contrast, governed boards of PSBs take conservative financial decisions and declare a low dividend. The findings are robust at disaggregate level, corroborating our main findings and additional analyses, including propensity score matching depicting that our conclusions are not beset by endogeneity or selection bias.