Rising inequality has caused concerns that democratic governments are no longer responding to majority demands, an argument the authors label the subversion of democracy model (sdm). The sdm comes in two forms: one uses public opinion data to show that policies are strongly biased toward the preferences of the rich; the other uses macrolevel data to show that governments aren’t responding to rising inequality. This article critically reassesses the sdm, points to potential biases, and proposes solutions that suggest a different interpretation of the data, which the authors label the representative democracy model (rdm). After testing the sdm against the rdm on public opinion data and on a new data set on fiscal policy, they find that middle-class power has remained remarkably strong over time, even as inequality has risen. The authors conclude that the rich have little influence on redistributive policies, and that the democratic state is apparently not increasingly constrained by global capital.

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 epidemic, governments across Europe have attempted to prevent the spread of the disease by limiting the movement of their citizens. In this article, we analyse whether the level of compliance with social distancing measures is associated with political, economic, and demographic factors. In particular, our interests lie in two areas. First, as lockdowns have dragged on, many countries see some political resistance, often, though not always, from populist movements: are localities that support populist movements more likely to ignore social distancing measures? Secondly, economic security: do localities with higher levels of income and wealth have higher levels of social distancing? We combine anonymised movement data from people's mobile phones drawn from the Google Community Mobility surveys with subnational economic and demographic data to answer these questions. It is found that across Europe, social distancing patterns correlate strongly with populist attitudes and economic security.

Do political outcomes respond more strongly to the preferences of the rich? In an age of rising inequality, this question has become increasingly salient. Yet, although an influential literature has emerged, no systematic account exists either of the severity of differentials in political responsiveness, the potential drivers of those differentials, or the variation across democracies. This article fills that gap. We analyze 1,163 estimates of responsiveness from 25 studies and find that, although this research collectively suggests that political outcomes better reflect the preferences of the rich, results vary considerably across models and studies. The divergence in results is partly driven by partisanship and the model specification, while we find no significant variation across either policy domains or general/specific measures of political outcomes. Finally, and against theoretical expectations, published research suggests that differentials in responsiveness are weaker in the United States compared to other developed democracies. The article contributes to our understanding of differential responsiveness by clarifying the main debates and findings in the literature, identifying issues and gaps, and pointing to fruitful avenues for future research.

Recent scholarship on inequality and political representation argues that economic elites are dominating democratic policy-making, yet it struggles to explain the underlying mechanisms. This article proposes that unequal responsiveness reflects asymmetries in information about fiscal policy across income classes, as opposed to being a structural bias inherent in capitalist democracy. I test the argument in a pathway case study of economic policy-making in Denmark, using a new data set that combines preference and spending data spanning 18 spending domains between 1985 and 2017. I find that governments that pursue standard macroeconomic policies coincidentally respond more strongly to the preferences of the affluent, owing to a closer adjustment of preferences to the state of the economy among citizens in upper income groups. These findings have important democratic and theoretical implications, as they suggest that unequal responsiveness may not reflect substantive misrepresentation of majority interests, but rather differences in information levels across groups.

Growing economic inequality has raised concerns that democratic governments are no longer responsive to popular demands for redistribution either because the state capacity is eroded by footloose capital or because the wealthy subvert democracy through the power of money. In this paper we critically assess these conjectures against long-standing arguments about redistribution and insurance under democracy. We test the alternatives on a new comprehensive dataset on income inequality from 17 advanced democracies between 1980 and 2019. We find that before taxes and transfers income inequality has increased markedly everywhere but also that government redistribution has played a critical role in compensating the middle class and to a perhaps surprising degree also the poor. However, the United States is a large outlier.