No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThe role of regulatory quality as one of the so-called deep determinants of growth has emerged as an important issue in economic research in the past 20 years. The positive or negative growth effects of a country's regulatory framework are amplified by economic integration, which makes factors and producers more mobile and enables them to avoid burdensome regulation. Therefore, the two potential determinants to growth might be interlinked. So far there is very little empirical evidence on the impact of the regulatory framework in an integrated economy on growth. We deal with the most common problems in estimating growth equations by using internal instruments to identify a causal relationship between regulation and growth in the presence of international trade and find evidence that both regulation and trade have a significant positive influence on growth, with the effect of regulation being especially pronounced for countries that have worse regulatory quality and for middle-income countries.2

No abstract

Does tariff liberalization cause regulatory chill by putting downward pressure on health, safety, and environmental standards? Or does it cause a race to the top as governments seek to use standards as nontariff barriers to trade? There remains remarkably little empirical evidence to answer these long-debated questions. We seek to address this lack by analyzing annual country-by-industry data on notifications of changes in sanitary and phytosanitary standards by world trade organization members. Our results suggest that the impact of increased trade pressure depends on whether domestic producers are likely to gain or lose from a change in standards. Regulatory chill is the dominant response in most countries, but countries in which producers can adapt to standards relatively cheaply appear to race to the top. Consequently, tariff liberalization encourages divergence in standards across countries.

In this paper, we examine the interplay of regional economic integration and the use of bilateral antidumping (AD) measures. Our empirical analysis brings three central findings to light: (i) we find that regional trade agreements (RTAs) generally reduce the likelihood of AD activity among integration partners; (ii) in addition, an improvement in the tariff treatment between trading partners—regardless of whether expressed as the directly faced tariff or as a tariff margin—generally leads to a lower likelihood of bilateral AD and (iii) regarding the interaction of both events, however, a reciprocally higher tariff margin between integration partners leads to a higher likelihood of bilateral AD than an equal tariff margin among non‐integration trading partners. The latter effect seems to be primarily driven by those RTAs with a participation of “South” countries.