Protests at and around climate summits attract media attention, but it has been assumed, rather than demonstrated, that such protests attract similar kinds of actors who share a common "climate justice" agenda. To test such assumptions, we analyze the patterns of participation in demonstrations around the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, centered around the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-15). Attended by 190 national delegations, with over 30,000 registered participants, 1 formal negotiations among political leaders were surrounded by meetings and seminars involving politicians, scientists, and representatives of a wide range of NGOs. The summit also prompted extraordinary mobilizations of demonstrators, both in Copenhagen and elsewhere. Although, as many of the demonstrators expected, the summit ended without agreement on an effective regime to address global climate change, it provided an important opportunity for networking and mobilization with potentially enduring consequences for the development of a transnational climate movement.The events surrounding COP-15 provided an opportunity to explore the demographic characteristics and political goals of demonstrators mobilized around the most compelling transnational environmental issue of our timeclimate change. By surveying different demonstrations related to a single transnational summit, we examine collective action addressing climate change from the perspective of rank-and-ªle participants, and so provide an important complement to the images conveyed by the slogans and rhetoric of the social movement organizations (SMOs) engaged with climate change.We analyze data on participants in the three largest European climate 1. Fisher 2010, 12.

This article explores the social composition of participants in anti-austerity protests taking place in Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2010 and 2012, based on over 3000 questionnaires distributed to protest participants according to a standardized method. Employing a distinction between three types of mobilizations, we compare protests anchored in the traditional 'old' labour movements, protests by smaller radical leftist unions and parties, and the ostensibly newer kinds of mobilizations in the form of Indignados and Occupy protests. Although easily forgotten, we argue that the two former types of anti-austerity protests deserve equal attention from researchers. We conclude that there are significant differences between the protest categories in terms of socio-demographic characteristics of their participants, but the participants nevertheless appear to maintain surprisingly similar political values across demonstration types. Class identification also differed. The participants in the Indignados/Occupy protests had a markedly lower degree of identification with the working class -regardless of the 'objective' labour market position and controlling for country differences. These aspects relate to the classic distinction between 'old' and 'new' social movements, but we argue that it risks obscuring a more complex pattern of similarities and differences between different anti-austerity mobilizations.

Present debates suppose a close linkage between economic, social, and environmental sustainability and suggest that individual wellbeing and living standards need to be understood as directly linked to environmental concerns. Because social movements are often seen as an avant-garde in pushing for change, this article analyzes climate protesters’ support for three key frames in current periods of social transformation, i.e., an “environmental”, an “economic growth”, and a “welfare” frame. The analyzed data material consists of survey responses from over 900 participants in six Global Climate Strikes held in Sweden during 2019. The article investigates the explanatory relevance of three factors: (a) political and ideological orientation, (b) movement involvement, and (c) social characteristics. The results indicate that climate protesters to a large degree support an environmental frame before an economic growth-oriented frame, whereas the situation is more complex regarding support for a welfare frame vis-á-vis an environmental frame. The strongest factors explaining frame support include social characteristics (gender) and protestors’ political and ideological orientation. Movement involvement has limited significance. The article shows how these frames form a fragment of the complexity of these issues, and instances of frame distinctions, hierarchies, and disputes emerge within the most current forms of climate change demonstrations.

Based on quantitative survey data collected during Pride parades in six European countries -the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland -we analyse who participates in Pride parades. Engaging with the socalled protest normalization thesis we ask: are Pride parade participants, aside from sexual orientation, representative of the wider populace? In none of the countries could we find indications that Pride participants mirror the general populations. The parades remain dominated by well-educated, middle strata youth, rich in political resources. However, we find variation between countries, which we link to differences in elite and public support for LGBT rights. KeywordsLGBT movements, normalization of demonstrations, Pride parades, protest participation, protest survey Pride parades are today staged in numerous countries and localities, providing the most visible manifestation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movements and politics. Pride parades, we argue, are foundational rituals for LGBT movements across the globe; as such they act as collective responses to oppression, encourage redefinition of self, and express collective identity (Engel,

Taking the contemporary political activism of 'the Global Justice Movement' as an illustrative case, this article scrutinizes some influential theoretical ideas about the consequences of 'individualization' for collective political action. Quite often, this process is seen as implying a new politics of individual life style -'life politics' -which is associated with new social movements and claimed to have gained importance since the 1960s, on the expense of the collective 'emancipatory politics' being associated with 'old social movements' such as the Labor Movement. In the light of the article's empirical findings, this alleged division between life politics and emancipatory politics is questioned, and it is argued that these two kinds of politics should be understood as intertwined practices. The article's theoretically grounded analysis is based on quantitative data from a survey of participants at the fifth European Social Forum. These data are interpreted and further explored using qualitative interviews with activists.