Purpose This paper aims to empirically analyse specific characteristics of an audit committee that could be associated with the likelihood of corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions. Design/methodology/approach The sample includes all firms that were investigated by the Financial Reporting Council through the audit enforcement procedure from 2014 to 2019, and two matched no-scandal firms. It uses logistic binary regression analysis to examine the hypotheses. Findings Results based on the logit regression suggest that audit member tenure and audit committee meeting frequency both have positive associations to the likelihood of corporate scandal. Complementing this result, the authors find negative but insignificant relationships amongst audit committee female chair, audit committee female members percentage, audit committee qualified accountants members, audit committee attendance, number of shares held by audit committee members, audit committee remuneration, board tenure and the likelihood of corporate scandal across the sample. Research limitations/implications The results should help regulatory policymakers make decisions, which could be crucial to future corporate governance. Additionally, these results should be useful to investors who use corporate governance as criteria for investment decisions. Originality/value The authors extend, as well as contribute to the growing literature on the audit committee, and therefore, wider corporate governance literature and provide originality in that it is the first, to the knowledge, to consider two characteristics (i.e. remuneration and gender) in a UK context of corporate scandal. Also, the results imply that the structure and diversity of the audit committee affect corporate fraud/scandal/sanctions.

This study adopts the concept of institutional voids to examine the perceptions of managers and policymakers in developing markets with respect to the actual barriers that hinder social and environmental reporting (SER) towards sustainable development. The study uses in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with managers and decision‐makers and policymakers of the main oil and gas companies in weak institutional settings (Libya). The findings suggest that the absence of environment general authority's role, the absence of a clear legal requirement that refers to SER, the shortage of knowledge and awareness, the lack of motivation from the government, fear of change, and the absence of civil society organisations are perceived as the major barriers that hinder the development of SER. These findings contribute to the literature on institutional voids and sustainable development by providing evidence on SER barriers in the context of a developing country. Therefore, it could be useful to corporate regulators and policymakers to mitigate institutional voids to develop a more focussed SER agenda, when considering regulations for the disclosure and sustainable development.

Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of board structure on risk-taking measured by research and development (R&D) intensity in OECD countries. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a panel data of 200 companies on Forbes global 2000 over the 2010-2014 period. It uses the ordinary least square multiple regression analysis techniques to examine the hypotheses. Findings The results show that the frequency of board meetings and board size are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking measured by R&D intensity, with a greater significance among Anglo-American countries than among Continental European countries. The rationale for this is that the legal and accounting systems in the Anglo American countries have greater protection through greater emphasis on compliance and disclosure, and therefore, allowing for less risk-taking. Research limitations/implications Future research could investigate risk-taking using different arrangements, conducting face-to-face meetings with the firm’s directors and shareholders. Practical implications The results suggest that better-governed firms at the firm- or national-level have a high expectancy of less risk-taking. These results offer regulators a resilient incentive to pursue corporate governance (CG) and disclosure reforms officially and mutually with national-level governance. Thus, these results show the monitoring and legitimacy benefits of governance, resulting in less risk-taking. Finally, the findings offer investors the opportunity to build specific expectations about risk-taking behaviour in terms of R&D intensity in OECD countries. Originality/value This study extends and contributes to the extant CG literature, by offering new evidence on the effect of board structure on risk-taking. The findings will help policymakers in different countries in estimating the sufficiency of the available CG reforms to prevent management mishandle and disgrace.