The power-sharing literature lacks a review that synthesizes its findings, despite spanning over 50 years since Arend Lijphart published his seminal 1969 article ‘Consociational Democracy’. This review article contributes to the literature by introducing and analysing an original dataset, the Power Sharing Articles Dataset, which extracts data on 23 variables from 373 academic articles published between 1969 and 2018. The power-sharing literature, our analysis shows, has witnessed a boom in publications in the last two decades, more than the average publication rate in the social sciences. This review offers a synthesis of how power sharing is theorized, operationalized and studied. We demonstrate that power sharing has generally positive effects, regardless of institutional set-up, post-conflict transitional character and world region. Furthermore, we highlight structural factors that are mostly associated with the success of power sharing. Finally, the review develops a research agenda to guide future scholarly work on power sharing.

What explains the move of Jordan to a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in 2016 but not in 2012? This is puzzling given the high public pressure for electoral reform in 2011–12 in the wake of the Arab uprisings compared to 2016. Applying veto player theory to Jordan, this article argues that the non-adoption of PR in 2012 and the subsequent move to PR in 2016 lies mainly in the regime’s perceived uncertainty associated with the results of elections. In 2012, it was feared that elections under a PR system would replicate the 1989 opposition-dominated parliament. The regime, therefore, opted for a mixed system by complementing the single non-transferable vote system with a national party list. To justify such a system, compared to the demanded PR system, the regime resorted to rhetoric directed at both elite and mass levels. In 2016, however, the uncertainty associated with adopting a PR system ceased to exist. The fragmentation of Jordan’s strongest opposition group, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, reduced uncertainty about their electoral strength. At the same time, malapportionment reduced uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the elections. The article shows how electoral reform in authoritarian regimes, as in some democracies, can be explained through the perceived uncertainty of elections’ outcomes.

This article argues for inductive exploration of mass–elite differences in new democracies. Grounded in the “delegate model” of political representation, I do this by studying issue positions and issue salience of masses before turning to elites. The article demonstrates this approach using Tunisia, the only Arab democracy, by analysing survey data and originally coded party manifesto data. From an issue position perspective, the article uncovers mass–elite incongruence on the democratic–authoritarian and secular–Islamist political dimensions. From an issue salience lens, there is mass–elite congruence on the economic dimension. How mass–elite incongruence unfolds might affect the future of democracy in Tunisia.