The European Parliament (EP) has become an increasingly important lobbying venue for business due to the recent enhancement of its regulatory powers. Existing research, however, disagrees on the extent to which the intensified business lobbying has resulted in increased business influence on EP policy outcomes. Some studies find a ‘business bias’ in the EP, while others still perceive it to be a forceful promoter of diffuse interests (such as consumer and environmental groups). This article examines the conditions under which business groups shape policy outcomes in the EP. The article uses a comparative qualitative case study design of four recent legislative dossiers, and draws on process‐tracing of EU documents and lobbying letters, and 145 interviews. It finds that the ability of business to leave its fingerprints on EP reports depends on a number of factors – most notably business unity, low issue salience and dossiers being dealt with by mainstream committees.

Executive Summary A wide range of interest groups target the European Parliament (EP) and MEPs have a reputation for being particularly open to diffuse interests, who, due to their limited resources, use 'friendly' MEPs to put pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the EP representing diffuse as opposed to concentrated interests, conflicts with the broader political science literature on interest groups that dwells on business bias. The general expectation in the literature is for concentrated groups (such as the automobile industry) to prevail over diffuse interests (such as environmental interests). This article considers whether this is a case of conventional wisdom confirmed -or a sectoral exceptionalism. In fact, there are good reasons to doubt the EP's reputation as a policy champion for diffuse interests. Much of our current knowledge about the EP's interest group politics stems from a time when the EP's legislative powers were more limited. Within a relatively short time span the EP has evolved from a token 'multi-lingual talking shop' to, what some researchers have named, one of the most powerful elected legislatures in the world. Arguably, as the powers of the EP have increased, so has attention from interest groups. Few interest groups now dare leave the parliamentary arena to their opponents, and most interest groups adopt a belt-and-braces approach in which 'the institutional trio' (the European Commission, Council and the EP) is lobbied throughout the policy process. The increased powers raises the question of whether the EP still privileges diffuse interests or simply reinforces the advantages of concentrated interests. This question is addressed in this article by examining one recent regulation: Regulation 2011/510/EC on the reduction of CO 2 emissions from light commercial vehicles. Based on processtracing of EU documents and lobbying letters, and interviews with MEPs, EP officials and interest groups, this article shows that the EP is no longer an environmental champion, but instead appears to be more of an environmental pragmatist. Three factors contribute to this change: asymmetric lobbying from industry, a change in the EP's negotiating strategy and increased cooperation between the EP committees. These changes have reduced the privileged position once held by diffuse interests, and provided concentrated interests with r

This study re‐examines the conclusions drawn from existing research on legislative behaviour in the European Parliament (EP). Using written questionnaires and qualitative interviews with all 14 current Danish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and three former MEPs, existing academic findings on voting behaviour in the EP are compared and contrasted with ground‐level experience from the MEPs' point of view. This study lends support to many of the conclusions drawn from previous quantitative research. However, it also shows that some of these findings cannot be fully understood without individual‐level information.

Balanced chromosomal rearrangements (BCRs), including inversions, translocations, and insertions, reorganize large sections of the genome and contribute substantial risk for developmental disorders (DDs). However, the rarity and lack of systematic screening for BCRs in the population has precluded unbiased analyses of the genomic features and mechanisms associated with risk for DDs versus normal developmental outcomes. Here, we sequenced and analyzed 1,420 BCR breakpoints across 710 individuals, including 406 DD cases and the first large-scale collection of 304 control BCR carriers. We found that BCRs were not more likely to disrupt genes in DD cases than controls, but were seven-fold more likely to disrupt genes associated with dominant DDs (21.3% of cases vs. 3.4% of controls; P = 1.60x10-12). Moreover, BCRs that did not disrupt a known DD gene were significantly enriched for breakpoints that altered topologically associated domains (TADs) containing dominant DD genes in cases compared to controls (odds ratio [OR] = 1.43, P = 0.036). We discovered six TADs enriched for noncoding BCRs (false discovery rate < 0.1) that contained known DD genes (MEF2C, FOXG1, SOX9, BCL11A, BCL11B, and SATB2) and represent candidate pathogenic long-range positional effect (LRPE) loci. These six TADs were collectively disrupted in 7.4% of the DD cohort. Phased Hi-C analyses of five cases with noncoding BCR breakpoints localized to one of these putative LRPEs, the 5q14.3 TAD encompassing MEF2C, confirmed extensive disruption to local 3D chromatin structures and reduced frequency of contact between the MEF2C promoter and annotated enhancers. We further identified six genomic features enriched in TADs preferentially disrupted by noncoding BCRs in DD cases versus controls and used these features to build a model to predict TADs at risk for LRPEs across the genome. These results emphasize the potential impact of noncoding structural variants to cause LRPEs in unsolved DD cases, as well as the complex interaction of features associated with predicting intolerance to alteration of three-dimensional chromatin topology.