War necessarily involves destruction. The development of precision-guided munitions seems to have made it possible to produce intended damage with increasing efficiency and to reduce 'collateral' damage. This has given rise to the expectation that fighting with such weapons reduces the extent of destruction and, crucially, that it is therefore becoming increasingly possible to protect non-combatants during war. This article examines this idea by exploring in some detail what is meant by 'precision' and asking how far this actually entails protection for non-combatants. The article shows how praise for precision not only produces Western warfare as ethical but also both relies upon and reproduces a particular kind of ethics, based on the notion of non-combatant protection. The conclusion draws together the implications of the faith in precision for how we think about war and challenges the underlying assumption that more precision is better.

In her recent work, Judith Butler offers a critique of war that revolves around the related issues of what she calls the grievability of lives and the framing of violence. This article explores aspects of the remembrance of UK military personnel killed on Operation TELIC in Iraq, drawing on Butler's powerful arguments about the way in which some lives are produced as more grievable than others. It explores a particular set of obituaries from Operation TELIC: those posted by the Ministry of Defence on its website. The concern is not with the fact that some lives remain unacknowledged, but rather with how the loss of lives that are acknowledged as grievable is represented. The obituaries here are a significant part of the production the frame that makes war possible. In Butler's scheme of grievable Western lives versus ungrievable non-Western lives no consideration is given to members of the military whose lives are grievable and yet put at risk in order, apparently, to protect other lives. Introducing this complication makes it possible to examine further how hierarchies of grief enable the possibility of war.

Constructivism is regarded as increasingly important in International Relations. More often than not the approach is related to the issue of identity. constructivism and identity are, however, in a dangerous liaison. This article argues that Alexander Wendt's constructivism needs identity as a central concept but that this very concept threatens to undermine the possibility of his constructivism. It is further suggested that this problem has some relevance to other constructivist approaches positioned in the middle ground between rationalist and reflectivist theorizing. The argument is illustrated with a consideration of the debates around the redefinition of the role of the Federal Republic of Germany to include the possibility of German military involvement abroad.

Contemporary Western war is represented as enacting the West’s ability and responsibility to help make the world a better place for others, in particular to protect them from oppression and serious human rights abuses. That is, war has become permissible again, indeed even required, as ethical war. At the same time, however, Western war kills and destroys. This creates a paradox: Western war risks killing those it proposes to protect. This book examines how we have responded to this dilemma and challenges the vision of ethical war itself. That is, it explores how the commitment to ethics shapes the practice of war and indeed how practices come, in turn, to shape what is considered ethical in war. The book closely examines particular practices of warfare, such as targeting, the use of cultural knowledge, and ethics training for soldiers. What emerges is that instead of constraining violence, the commitment to ethics enables and enhances it. The book argues that the production of ethical war relies on an impossible but obscured separation between ethics and politics, that is, a problematic politics of ethics, and reflects on the need to make decisions at the limit of ethics.