Logics for resource-bounded agents have been getting more and more attention in recent years since they provide us with more realistic tools for modelling and reasoning about multi-agent systems. While many existing approaches are based on the idea of agents as imperfect reasoners, who must spend their resources to perform logical inference, this is not the only way to introduce resource constraints into logical settings. In this paper we study agents as perfect reasoners, who may purchase a new piece of information from a trustworthy source. For this purpose we propose dynamic epistemic logic for semi-public queries for resource-bounded agents. In this logic (groups of) agents can perform a query (ask a question) about whether some formula is true and receive a correct answer. These queries are called semi-public, because the very fact of the query is public, while the answer is private. We also assume that every query has a cost and every agent has a budget constraint. Finally, our framework allows us to reason about group queries, in which agents may share resources to obtain a new piece of information together. We demonstrate that our logic is complete, decidable and has an efficient model checking procedure.

The need for tools and techniques to formally analyze and trace the responsibility for unsafe outcomes to decision-making actors is urgent. Existing formal approaches assume that the unsafe outcomes for which actors can be held responsible are actually realized. This paper considers a broader notion of responsibility where unsafe outcomes are not necessarily realized, but their probabilities are unacceptably high. We present a logic combining strategic, probabilistic and temporal primitives designed to express concepts such as the risk of an undesirable outcome and being responsible for exceeding a risk threshold. We demonstrate that the proposed logic is complete and decidable.